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Abstract 
The present study tested the hypothesis that the ability 
to modify Rorschach responses under different 
instructional sets (i.e., standard and fake) would vary 
as a function of the subject's psychiatric status. 
Contrary to expectations, it was found that, for the 
most part, nonpsychiatric subjects were not able to 
modify Rorschach responses to any greater degree than 
psychiatric patients. There were, however, a number of 
significant differences in responses as a function of 
instructional set (i.e., standard or fake). In 
addition, clinical experts were able to distinguish 
faked from standard protocols for several nonpsychiatric 
subjects but could not do so for psychiatric subjects. 
The Effect of Instructional Sets on the Rorschach 
Some individuals seen by mental health 
professionals have been found to misrepresent the type 
and magnitude of their problems on psychological tests. 
Their motives are varied but include 1) possible 
monetary gain through disability payments, 2) 
anticipation of more favorable legal consequences if 
litigation is pending, and 3) a desire to impress their 
distress upon mental health workers as a "cry for help'', 
among others. Whatever the motives, the individual may 
misrepresent his or her situation in such a way that 
leads the mental health worker to devise inaccurate 
diagnoses and treatment regimens. 
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Many clinicians often give great weight to 
projective tests such as the Rorschach when objective 
test findings are of dubious validity (Meyer, 1986) 
There is a plethora of studies suggesting that 
misrepresentation of psychiatric status by a patient can 
be detected on objective personality tests such as the 
MMPI (e.g., Kroger & Turnbull, 1975). In contrast, 
there are fewer than 15 studies examining the 
susceptibility of the Rorschach projective test to 
misrepresentation or ''faking." This is surprising given 
that the Rorschach has been the first and second most 
researched personality measure before and after 1971, 
respectively (Polyson, Peterson, & Marshall, 1986) . 
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Many commentators have asserted that the Rorschach 
is least vulnerable to response alteration relative to 
other psychometric measures (see Albert, Fox, & 
Kahn,1980; Mittman, 1983; Seamons, Howell, Carlisle, & 
Roe,1981). The reasoning for such a claim is based on 
the "projective hypothesis" which states that, when 
confronted with an unstructured stimulus, a person will, 
"actively and spontaneously structure unstructured 
material and, in so doing, reveal his structuring 
principles--which are the principles of his 
psychological structure," (Rapaport, Gill, & Schafer, 
1946, p.7). The argument follows that when provided 
with an unstructured stimulus a person does not have the 
"rules of conformity and conventionality" to guide his 
or her response as they might on an objective measure 
such as the MMPI, hence making a projective test such as 
the Rorschach difficult to "fake" (Easton & Feigenbaum, 
1967) . 
In early studies examining faking, Fosberg (1938; 
1941) administered the Rorschach under four different 
instructional sets to each subject. The instructions, 
given in the same sequence to all subjects, included: 
1) standard, 2) "make the very best impression you can," 
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3) "make the worst possible impression", and 4) to look · 
for particular determinants (e.g., human responses). In 
his first report, Fosberg presented data from two case 
studies. Rorschach indices were analyzed across the 
four sets of instructions with chi-square analyses to 
examine whether the four records were, " ... no more than 
random deviations from a distribution in which the 
Rorschach categories are in a fixed relationship to one 
another?" (p. 12). In addition, Fosberg postulated that 
the chi-square analyses would discern how closely the 
actual frequencies for each Rorschach response category 
(e.g., R) would fit with the theoretical distribution 
of frequencies. Based on nonsignificant findings, 
Fosberg concluded that the Rorschach test was not 
susceptible to manipulation. 
Fosberg's second study included fifty students. 
Data were analyzed by test-retest correlations of the 
different Rorschach categories (e.g., location, 
determinants, and content) . As with his previous study, 
Fosberg concluded that the high positive test-retest 
correlations (i.e., .80 or better) for these categories 
across instructional sets (i.e., standard and "worst 
impression") were indicative of the Rorschach's 
resiliency to manipulation. 
Cronbach (1949) criticized Fosberg's statistical 
analyses in both of the foregoing studies. 
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Specifically, Fosberg assumed that the chi-square 
analyses in the first study showed that the protocols 
for each person corresponded and were not paired at 
random. That is, the U score in the first record was 
nearer to the U score in the second record than it was 
to~' or other scores. But, as Cronbach explained, 
similar results would have been obtained even if the 
records from different people had been used in that each 
score has a limited range (i.e., U tends to be large, m 
tends to be small, etc.); hence, a significant chi-
square would have been obtained regardless of whether 
intra- or inter-individual comparisons had been made. 
Cronbach's criticism of Fosberg's correlational 
analysis is also based on the greater magnitude of 
responses for certain indices relative to others. For 
example, Fosberg correlated pairs of values such as Nl-
N2, Ul--U2, etc. As previously noted, U tends to be 
large while another index such as m tends to be small. 
Consequently, the high frequency of U responses may 
cause the two sets to correlate and would have done so 
even if the correlated scores came from two different 
subjects. 
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Although lacking in statistical analyses like 
Fosberg, Rosenberg and Feldberg (1944) presented a 
qualitative description of Rorschach responses for a 
group of 93 soldiers identified as known malingerers or 
suspected of malingering on a psychiatric examination. 
The authors asserted that signs of malingering on the 
Rorschach included few number of responses, an increased 
amount of popular responses relative to norms, and a 
tendency to recognize difficuit forms and reject easy 
forms. Perhaps of most help to the Rorschach examiner 
in detecting misrepresentation, was the authors' 
description of respondents' behavior during testing of 
the limits. They found that during this procedure 
examinees would often either refuse to see any new 
responses, even when shown to the respondent in minute 
detail. The authors interpreted this behavior as the 
respondent thinking he must be absolutely consistent 
with his initial performance or else he would "give 
himself away." 
The next empirical study following Fosberg's was 
Carp and Shavzin's (1950) attempt to replicate Fosberg's 
earlier findings. Using a test-retest design, they 
asked twenty undergraduates to take the Rorschach twice 
during the same assessment period; once under ''good" and 
"bad" instructional sets, respectively, with the order 
counterbalanced. The relationship of Rorschach indices 
(i.e., £, etc.) between trials was examined via t-tests 
and correlations. 
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The t-test results showed that only ~ responses 
differed across instructional sets. The authors 
acknowledged that the lack of more differences could 
have been because subjects may have adopted different 
strategies in "faking" their responses. That is, some 
subjects may have increased or decreased certain or all 
responses which could have resulted in differences being 
balanced out in the analyses due to the diversity in 
direction taken. Correlations between indices across 
trials ranged from .16 to .97. The M, .c.E., and .c..t. 
response categories had correlations of .16, .17, and 
.33, respectively. The authors concluded that, in 
general, subjects' responses on the "good" test did not 
show a close relationship with the same response 
categories of the "bad" test (i.e., Ml compared to M2, 
etc.) Hence, contrary to Fosberg's results, Carp and 
Shavzin claimed that the Rorschach can be manipulated by 
some subjects. 
Feldman and Graley (1954) attempted to clarify the 
apparent contradictory findings of the Fosberg and Carp 
& Shavzin's studies. They used a group administration 
of the Rorschach with two groups of undergraduate 
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students to examine changes in responses across standard 
and "worst impression" instructional sets. One group 
took the test under both sets of instructions two weeks 
apart, while the other took it only under the "worst 
impression" set. The authors compared changes between 
pre- and post-test data for 35 Rorschach categories by 
using a chi-square analysis. The median of the combined 
groups was used as a cutting score to measure 
individual's changes per category. Several of the 
indices changed across instructional set with the 
determinant and formal content categories changing the 
most and location scores hardly at all. 
Unfortunately, conclusions made from the foregoing 
results are somewhat obscured in that the authors did 
not control for the total number of responses per 
individual across trials. Another methodological 
drawback to this study is, of course, the group 
administration which is contrary to the typical 
procedure and scoring of Rorschach's given individually. 
Hence, extrapolations as to misrepresentation for 
individual administrations based on Feldman and Graley's 
findings is problematic. 
The foregoing limitations aside, Feldman and Graley 
were the first researchers to empirically examine the 
ability of clinicians to detect standard and "faked" 
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protocols. They found that, in using a sorting 
procedure, four judges were able to successfully 
differentiate standard from "faked" protocols beyond 
chance levels. Two of the judges were told the 
proportion of standard to faked protocols and two were 
not. The informed judges appeared more accurate in 
detection. There were, however, only six cases examined 
and only descriptive analyses were reported, thereby, 
limiting the interpretation of this base-rate knowledge 
(i.e., proportion of normal to fake) on the clinicians' 
responses. Interestingly, the examinee's inability to 
significantly alter responses across instructional sets 
was speculated to be the result of the rigid and 
inhibited members of the group who may not have been 
able to comply with the unstructured task (i.e., "worst 
impression" instructions). This was the first 
intimation in this line of research which suggested that 
the psychological status of a person may affect their 
ability to significantly alter a Rorschach protocol. 
Some years after the foregoing study, Easton and 
Feigenbaum (1967) examined the Rorschach responses of 36 
undergraduates in a test-retest design. Two groups of 
subjects were given standard Rorschach administrations 
and, immediately afterward, half were asked to "fake 
bad" on a second administration while the other half 
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were again given the standard instructions. The authors 
used t-tests to examine differences on selected 
Rorschach categories for all comparisons. They found 
significant differences between certain test-retest 
categories for both groups of subjects, in addition to 
group differences on second administration comparisons. 
Based on their results and at first glance, it would 
appear that multiple administrations of the Rorschach 
alone, irrespective of instructional set, lead to 
changes in response categories. Unfortunately, however, 
the authors did not control for total productivity 
(i.e., B) in their analyses which obfuscates any 
interpretations of such results. 
Albert, Fox, and Kahn (1980) were next to address 
the issue of faking on the Rorschach by employing 
Feldman and Graley's previously-described methodology of 
using judges to detect malingering. They asserted that 
the examinee's knowledge of psychopathology would 
differentially affect their ability to alter responses, 
thereby affecting clinicians' ability to detect faked 
protocols obtained from psychiatric inpatients and 
normals. To test this hypothesis, they obtained 
protocols from six psychiatric patients and 18 
undergraduates. The students were categorized into 
groups of 1) "uninformed fakers" who were asked to 
malinger as a paranoid schizophrenic, 2) "informed 
fakers" who received descriptions of schizophrenic 
symptoms but no instructions as how to respond on the 
Rorschach, and 3) normal controls. Sets of four 
protocols were then given to expert judges to evaluate 
their ability to detect malingering. 
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The judges designated only nine percent of the 
protocols as malingered, albeit the authors did not 
report possibly important baseline information (i.e., 
how many faked and standard protocols were given to each 
judge). The authors' main hypothesis was confirmed 
statistically in that judges detected fewer informed 
fakers' protocols as malingers compared to uninformed 
fakers; hence, it appeared that subjects' knowledge of 
psychopathology did affect judges' ability to discern 
misrepresentation on the Rorschach. 
Seamons and co-workers (1981) addressed the 
foregoing issue of psychopathology in a different 
manner. They examined the effect of instructional set 
on the Rorschach responses of prison inmates and 
forensic patients by categorizing 48 subjects into four 
groups which varied along a continuum of pathology: 1) 
nonschizophrenic, 2) latent schizophrenic, 3) residual 
schizophrenic, and 4) schizophrenic. Using a 2 X 4 
counter-balanced design, controlling for the order of 
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administration, subjects were asked to take the 
Rorschach and portray themselves as "normal" and 
"mentally ill" on separate occasions with a 25 day test-
retest interval. 
Analyses of variance detected only one significant 
difference for determinants (i.e., £) across 
instructional sets; 48 Rorschach variables were 
examined. Based on a review by an independent 
psychologist, however, an increase in dramatic responses 
(i.e., blood, mutilation, decapitation, etc.) was noted 
and subsequently shown to be statistically significant 
when responses were categorized along this 
operationally-defined dimension (i.e., dramatic vs. 
nondramatic) and analyzed. The clinician was able to 
accurately differentiate normal from mentally ill 
protocols in 80 percent of the sample. Hence, it 
appears that, in this instance, the degree of 
psychopathology may not have been varied enough to 
produce significant differences on traditional Rorschach 
indices as a result of different instructional sets. On 
the other hand, a method of classifying response 
categories was determined which assisted a judge in 
blindly discerning "normal" from "mentally ill" 
protocols. 
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This latter finding is not surprising in that it 
appears the judge was able to review the "normal" and 
"mentally ill'' protocols for the same individual. It is 
tenable to expect that many of the responses for the 
same individual may not vary considerably across 
administrations. Hence, it is conceivable that the 
judge was able to match normal and mentally ill 
protocols for each individual and merely select the one 
with the most dramatic responses as representative of 
greatest pathology. 
A more recent attempt to test the susceptibility of 
the Rorschach to malingering ~nvolved 90 clinicians who 
examined normal and faked protocols (Mittman, 1983) . In 
this study, Rorschach protocols included records taken 
from inpatient depressives, inpatient schizophrenics, 
uninformed fakers, informed fakers, and normal controls. 
Each clinician was given a randomly selected package of 
five protocols. Results showed that these judges 
detected only a small percentage of the faked protocols. 
Most recently, Meisner (1988) requested 
undergraduates to malinger "depression" on the Rorschach 
after being provided descriptions of DSM-III depressive 
symptoms. Findings showed that prospective malingerers 
I 
gave more "morbid" and "blood" responses, in addition to 
lower total productivity, relative to controls. On the 
whole, however, other Rorschach indices showed limited 
susceptibility to malingering. 
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A unique study utilized Exner's Computer 
Interpretation program to analyze faked Rorschach 
protocols submitted to clinical judges in an earlier 
study (Khan, Fox, & Rhode, 1988) . The computer program 
had a false positive rate (i.e., rating true protocols 
as invalid) 33 percent of the time and a false negative 
rate 66 percent of the time. The determination of 
invalidity was apparently made predominantly on the 
basis of low productivity (i.e., B). The computerized 
judgments were better than those of previous clinical 
judges, however, in rating 33 percent of faked protocols 
as malingered compared to eight percent for the experts. 
The foregoing studies have been important in 
addressing the problem of deception on the Rorschach. 
Nevertheless, the basic question of, "Can subjects 
significantly alter Rorschach protocols relative to 
their 'true' profile?" remains unanswered for a number 
of reasons. Specifically, the research described above 
has been plagued by: 1) conceptual problems, 2) 
statistical deficiencies, 3) methodological problems, 4) 
the lack of theoretical considerations, and 5) a minimum 
of external validity. 
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Conceptual Issues: Each of the foregoing studies 
has only alluded to what constitutes misrepresentation 
on the Rorschach, using such ~escriptors as, "faking," 
"malingering," and "deception." The reason an examinee 
may misrepresent their responses on the Rorschach has, 
essentially, been unaddressed. For example, as with the 
MMPI, an individual may intentionally or unintentionally 
respond to the test as a "cry for help" and try to alert 
the examiner as to their psychological distress and need 
for treatment. Alternatively, an examinee may 
deliberately attempt to deceive the examiner in order to 
receive preferential treatment as might be the case with 
a legal defendant wanting to avoid prosecution or a 
claimant desiring to obtain disability benefits. 
The foregoing studies examining faking on the 
Rorschach asked subjects to respond as if: 1) they 
wanted to avoid being drafted into the military, 2) they 
wanted to "create the best or worst possible impression 
of yourself," as viewed by a group of psychologists, or 
3) they were a psychiatric patient (with and without the 
benefit of role instructions) . Obviously, these varied 
instructions may produce different strategies of 
deception. It would seem that the intent of 
misrepresentation would be a significant variable 
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affecting the generalizability of findings in this type 
of research. 
The present proposal is concerned with only one 
type of deception on the Rorschach--a deliberate and 
intentional strategy with the intent of escaping 
criminal prosecution due to legal insanity. There are, 
of course, many possible motivations to deceive, as 
mentioned previously. The present deceptive strategy 
has been selected arbitrarily. No assumption is made 
that this motivation for deception occurs more 
frequently than others. It would seem, however, that 
only after one possible impetus for deception is 
investigated, in a methodologically and statistically 
correct manner, would it seem appropriate to direct 
attention to how other intentions might affect 
responses. 
Statistical Issues: Some of the statistical 
deficiencies in previous studies have already been 
highlighted. For example, it was noted that in some 
studies correlational analyses were performed which may 
have yielded spurious results due to the restricted 
frequency of responses of Rorschach categories (i.e., 
correlations across categories such as R traditionally 
have many responses and categories such as m have few 
responses rather than a function of the different 
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instructions per se) . Moreover, several studies failed 
to control for the total productivity of responses 
(i.e., R) per subject, hence making any statistical 
change in response categories across instructional sets 
difficult to interpret (i.e., is the change a result of 
the respondent actually changing determinants or a 
result of an increase or decrease in total number of 
responses which would, consequently, affect the number 
of determinants in any one category?) . Finally in 
regard to statistical issues, some of the foregoing 
studies reported significant changes as a result of the 
different instructions. These are statistically 
significant changes, however, and their clinical 
importance must be addressed. That is, even if 
statistically significant changes occur, are they of the 
magnitude that might change clinical judgments? 
The present study will attempt to improve upon 
previous statistical approaches. First, changes in 
total productivity per subject will be controlled by 
covarying total responses across administrations. 
Second, the present investigation will also focus on the 
magnitude of changes. That is, the number of response 
categories that change by a standard deviation or more 
relative to existing norms will be examined. It seems 
tenable that an increase or decrease by this amount 
would alter clinical judgments. 
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Methodological Issues: All of the foregoing 
studies reporting quantitative results have used a 
repeated-measures design with varying test-retest 
intervals. Only a few of the studies counterbalanced 
the order of instructions to control for possible 
sequential effects of the instructions. The repeated-
measures design seems most appropriate in answering the 
question of, "how would a subject's deceptive responses 
differ from their usual responses on the Rorschach?" At 
first glance, it would seem that one administration may 
contaminate the other. That is, would a subject give 
entirely different responses if asked only to fake 
compared to responses given when asked to give both fake 
and standard responses? But the empirical question at 
hand concerns subjects' ability to modify or change 
their "standard" responses more than how groups of 
subjects might differ if one offers their "standard" 
responses and another gives "faked" responses. 
Consequently, a test-retest design seems most 
appropriate to address the research question concerning 
subjects' ability to modify Rorschach responses. 
Given the appropriateness of the repeated-measures 
design to address the experimental question, the issue 
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of test-retest interval remains. Many of the above-
cited studies used test-retest intervals of several days 
while others gave multiple administrations on the same 
day. It would seem that an interval spanning days would 
risk changes of responding as a result of extraneous 
variables (e.g., change in psychological status) in 
addition to instructional set. The present 
investigation will attempt to minimize such extraneous 
variance by repeating Rorschach administrations in one 
session and counterbalancing the order of instructions. 
Another methodological issue needing to be 
addressed is the type of population used. For the most 
part, previous studies have examined the capability of 
students to modify Rorschach responses across 
instructional sets. Only one study (Seamons et al., 
1981) actually used subjects (prisoners) judged to have 
a psychiatric disorder in a test-retest format which 
found few changes in response categories across 
instructional sets except for those involving content. 
Other studies not directly examining malingering have 
suggested that psychiatric patients have difficulty in 
altering Rorschach responses even when specifically 
directed (e.g., Exner, 1976; Fabrikant, 1953). 
Theoretical Issues: A possible explanation as to 
why psychiatric patients may have difficulty in altering 
20 
their Rorschach responses may have to do with what has 
been called a "loss of boundaries" (Kernberg, 1967; 
1970). Boundaries are hypothetical constructs which 
refer to the ability to create particular cognitive and 
affective distinctions along some bipolar continuum. 
For example, when a child is unable to distinguish 
between fantasy and external reality, it can be said 
that the child is incapable of forming a particular 
boundary which integrates content and defines experience 
(Wilson, 1985). In terms of the Rorschach, a loss of 
boundaries might be exemplified when a respondent 
personalizes their answer such as, "This reminds me of 
going to the circus when I was young." Rapaport, Gill, 
and Schafer (1968) have explained this loss of 
boundaries by certain examinees as an inability to take 
proper "distance" from the inkblots due to a failure in 
certain ego functions. 
Based on the foregoing reasoning, it would seem 
tenable to suggest that the ability to significantly 
alter Rorschach responses may be based on the examinee's 
psychiatric status. Consequently, it would seem 
important to examine whether the ability to alter 
Rorschach responses may vary along a continuum of 
psychological dysfunction by utilizing a sample of 
psychiatric patients. 
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External Validity: Previous studies have attempted 
to make their investigations clinically relevant by 
examining the ability of psychologists to detect "faked" 
protocols. Results have been mixed with one study 
finding that judges could readily detect faked protocols 
while other studies found judges to be error prone. As 
previously described, however, the more successful 
judges apparently had the benefit of seeing both the 
standard and faked protocols; hence, their "hit" rate 
may have been inflated by merely matching protocols of 
individuals that had certain identical responses across 
administrations and identifying the protocol as faked if 
it had more dramatic responses. Consequently, it 
appears important to eliminate this bias in a judgment 
task. 
In addition to the foregoing procedural issue, the 
ability of judges to identify faked protocols must be 
considered in terms of being clinically meaningful. To 
ask a judge to identify faked Rorschach protocols 
without benefit of other data seems far removed from 
clinical reality. In actuality, a clinician is likely 
to have background information, observations, and other 
test data upon which to make clinical judgments 
concerning deception. Hence, to address the issue of 
generalizability of experimental findings, it seems 
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important to examine how additional clinical information 
in conjunction with Rorschach protocols might affect the 
success of judges to discern faking. The present study 
will examine the effect of the presence or absence of 
information (e.g., patient's age and sex; clinical 
setting; psychiatric status; marital status; highest 
level of education; present job, if any) on clinical 
judges' ability to identify faked Rorschach protocols 
and make accurate diagnoses. 
Based on the foregoing highlights, it can be 
asserted that the susceptibility of the Rorschach to 
response alteration remains op.en to empirical 
verification. That is, the ability to "fake" a 
Rorschach presupposes that the subject will be able to 
suppress or elaborate upon their "true" responses. This 
ability has yet to be substantiated in a 
methodologically correct way. Furthermore, there may be 
important variables that affect the ability to alter 
Rorschach responses. For example, does the 
psychological status (i.e., psychiatric or 
nonpsychiatric) of subjects affect the ability to fake? 
In addition, even if subjects are successful in altering 
their responses to produce statistically significant 
changes, will the magnitude of those changes be great 
enough to change clinical judgments? Moreover, can 
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clinical judges discern faked protocols more accurately 
than non-faked protocols if the task is made more 
realistic by providing additional clinical information? 
The present proposal will address the foregoing issues 
and questions. 
Hypotheses: The formal hypotheses are as follows: 
1. The ability to modify Rorschach responses under 
different instructional sets will vary as to whether the 
subject is a psychiatric or medical patient. Hence, it 
is predicted that nonpsychiatric medical patients as a 
group will be able to change Rorschach responses (see 
Appendix A) to a greater degree relative to the 
psychiatric subject. It is asserted that this 
difference will not be the result of demographic or 
intellectual differences between groups. 
2. Judges' accuracy in detecting a faked Rorschach 
will vary as a function of having additional clinical 
information. That is, judges who know more about the 
patient who produced the protocol being reviewed (e.g., 
sex, verbal intelligence, clinical setting, psychiatric 
status, marital history, present job, if any) will have 
better success in identifying faked protocols relative 
to judges who do not have such information. 
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Method 
Subjects. Forty participants were obtained from the 
inpatient psychiatric ward at the Veterans Hospital, 
White River Junction, Vermont. Three patients who were 
floridly psychotic, uncooperative, or delirious, as 
judged by a clinical psychologist assisting in the study 
were excluded. In addition, the patient's treating 
clinician was contacted to rule out patients he or she 
thought might find the procedure aversive or for whom 
the present study might interfere with psychological 
testing to be ordered as part of their diagnostic work 
up (i.e., four). 
Forty nonpsychiatric medical subjects were obtained 
from both medical outpatient clinics from the same 
hospital or were solicited from newspaper advertisements 
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requesting participation from. veterans. Nonpsychiatric 
medical subjects taking psychotropic medication were 
excluded. In addition, nonpsychiatric medical subjects 
were asked to complete a brief mental health instrument 
(see Appendix B) . Subjects indicating more than 
occasional (i.e., "sometimes"} psychological distress 
were excluded. As a further screen for psychiatric 
problems these volunteers were asked to take a short-
form of the MMPI (Faushingbauer, 1966) . Any patient 
obtaining an invalid profile or having one or more 
25 
elevated clinical scales (i.e., more than two standard 
deviations from the mean) were eliminated from the 
study. Furthermore, each nonpsychiatric medical subject 
was interviewed briefly (e.g., previous psychiatric 
history, employment background, interpersonal 
interactions, present stressors, etc.) by a staff 
psychologist who rated each subject according to their 
overall level of psychiatric functioning using the 
Global Assessment Scale (Endicott, Spitzer, Fleiss, & 
Cohen, 1976). All nonpsychiatric medical subjects had 
to obtain a rating of 61 or above to be included. Both 
psychiatric and nonpsychiatric medical subjects were 
asked to take The Quick Test (Ammons & Ammons, 1962) to 
serve as a comparison for intellectual level between 
groups. 
Desi<;m. 
a) Test-Retest: The two groups of subjects, 
psychiatric and nonpsychiatric medical, were asked to 
take the Rorschach on the same. day under two sets of 
instructions: 1) standard (Exher, 1986) and 2) "fake." 
The latter set of instructions were as follows: 
I would like for you to g~ve responses that you 
think would create a misimpression of yourself if 
the answer were given to a team of doctors. For 
example, if you wanted to convince a team of 
doctors that your were criminally insane--but, in 
truth, you were not-- give answers that you think 
would lead them to believe that you were of such 
mind as to be unable to co~prehend the consequences 
of your acts and be unable to distinguish between 
right and wrong conduct. 
I realize that you may actually have a 
psychiatric disability and problems. But you are 
likely to still be able to distinguish between 
right and wrong conduct. Give answers that you 
think might make a team of doctors think you were 
legally insane in order to avoid criminal 
prosecution. 
Let me remind you that this is only an 
experiment. No record of your answers will be 
placed in your chart. This is for research only 
and in no way will ever affect your medical 
treatment, present disability status or future 
application for disability. 
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The dependent measures were 42 Rorschach variables 
obtained from Exner's Comprehensive Scoring System 
(1986; see Appendix A) . 
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b) Judges' Task: In addition to the foregoing 
test-retest comparisons, standard and faked protocols 
were given to expert judges. These judges were 
respondents who answered request letters sent to 200 
Rorschach workshops alumni conducted by Exner (see 
Mittman, 1983). Of the 200 alumni enlisted,thirty 
judges completed the evaluation of the protocols. Two 
sets of judges received different packets of four 
Rorschach protocols each (i.e., Exner scores and 
responses verbatim including the inquiry; eight 
different protocols in all) . More than one set of 
protocols was used in case one of the protocols may have 
been, for some reason, aberrant. 
The four protocols in each set consisted of two 
from the psychiatric population and two from the 
nonpsychiatric population (on~ taken under standard and 
one taken under "faked" instructions for both groups) 
The protocols were randomly selected with the only 
constraint being that standard and "faked" records were 
not those of the same individual. In addition, only the 
first administration (i.e., either standard or fake) 
were used in order to control for order of presentation. 
This does not enable a test-retest format that was used 
in the previous evaluation looking at the ability of 
subjects' to alter their Rorschach responses across 
administrations. 
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Half of the judges in each group received 
background information for the protocols. Specifically, 
these judges were told: 1) the person's age, sex, 
education, employment status, and marital status, 2) 
the setting (i.e., Veteran's Hospital, 3) whether the 
person had a previous psychiatric history (for 
nonpsychiatric patients, judges were told no previous 
psychiatric information was available), and 4) verbal 
intelligence. 
The judges were asked to rate whether they thought 
a given protocol was given under standard or fake 
instructional sets along a seven point Likert scale 
(i.e., l=sure taken under standard instructions; 7=sure 
given under fake instructions; see Appendix C) . In 
addition, judges were asked to weight the importance of 
various input (i.e., Rorschach ratios, determinants, 
location, content, sequence of responses, clinical 
information when provided, and other input to be 
identified by the judge) along a continuum (i.e., l=not 
important to 7=very important) in regard to forming 
their judgments as to whether a protocol has been faked. 
All judges were asked to provide a variety of 
information concerning their background with the 
Rorschach (see Appendix D) . 
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Judges were also asked to rate the protocols as to 
how adjusted/maladjusted they felt the examinee was 
based on all available information (i.e., l=very well 
adjusted; 7=very maladjusted) . As before, they were 
asked to rate the importance of the foregoing variables 
in this decision. 
Procedure 
Psychiatric subjects were randomly selected from a 
list of ward patients, given the aforementioned-
mentioned constraints. Nonpsychiatric subjects were 
solicited via hospital and newspaper advertisements. 
Subjects were given The Quick Test and, for 
nonpsychiatric participants, the MMPI prior to taking 
the Rorschach. GAS ratings of the nonpsychiatric 
subjects were also made prior to the Rorschach 
administrations. 
The Rorschach was administered by three post-
masters level examiners, all of whom have had previous 
training in administering and scoring the Rorschach with 
Exner's system. Examiners were blind to the subject's 
psychiatric status and order of Rorschach 
administration. The order of administration (i.e., 
standard or fake) was determined randomly with the only 
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constraint of having an equal number of subjects per 
design condition; hence, the order was counterbalanced. 
A psychologist not serving as the examiner introduced 
the subject to the study. Subjects were informed as to 
the intent of the study and the "fake" and standard 
instructions. Subjects were asked to not let the 
examiner know in which order they were giving responses 
(i.e., fake or standard). In some instances, the 
psychologist not serving as an examiner, instructed the 
subject as to the order they were to give responses in 
order to ensure an equal numbe.r of subjects per 
condition. The second administration of the Rorschach 
followed the first as soon as possible on the same day. 
Protocols were scored by one of the examiners who 
was blind to the subjects' psychiatric and instruction 
status. A random check of scoring on 20 protocols was 
performed by two independent psychologists, both of whom 
also lacked knowledge as to the subjects' experimental 
conditions. When there were disagreements across 
raters, scores were changed based on consultation with 
the most experienced rater in terms of years of 
experience using and teaching the Exner scoring system. 
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Results 
a) Test-Retest: Relevant demographic information 
is summarized in Table 1. Psychiatric and 
nonpsychiatric subjects differed for Verbal IQ, 
~(78)=4.95, p < .01, and years of education, ~(78)=4.23, 
p < .01. Hence, these variables were included as 
covariates in all analyses. In addition, the total 
number of responses for each administration was used as 
a covariate in many analyses. Mean responses and 
standard deviations for each subject condition (i.e., 
psychiatric, standard instructions first; psychiatric, 
fake instructions first; nonpsychiatric, standard 
instructions first; nonpsychiatric, fake instructions 
first) are shown in Table 2. 
Upon reviewing the data, it was determined that 
four subjects (three psychiatric and one nonpsychiatric) 
may not have completely understood that they were to 
attempt to alter their responses across administrations; 
the examiner made notations that the subjects expressed 
confusion as to the task objectives. Their responses on 
the second administration was almost identical to the 
first administration, hence, underscoring a possible 
misunderstanding of the instr~ctions. Consequently, the 
data for their second administration were omitted; it 
was not possible to replace these subjects due to 
institutional constraints. 
A series of 2 (Group: nonpsychiatric vs. 
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psychiatric) X 2 (Administration: first and second) X 2 
(Initial instruction: fake or standard administration 
first) repeated-measures MANACOVAs were used to examine 
the Rorschach response categories when it was possible 
to group a number of variables into logical categories 
(e.g., N, U, J:ld, and Sas location variables, etc.). 
When it was not possible to group variables in order to 
minimize Type I error, separate repeated-measures 
ANACOVAs were conducted. 
The MANACOVA examining the location variables did 
not reveal any significant effects, although there was a 
marginal effect for time, £(4,68)=2.49, ~ < .06. It 
appeared that, regardless of group membership or which 
type of instruction was used initially, subjects tended 
to give more N responses on the first administration 
than the second, although this was not examined via 
univariate tests, given the nonsignificant MANACOVA 
findings (see Table 3 for means and standard 
deviations) . 
A MANACOVA was conducted for the organizational 
variables .z..t, .z...s..JlM, and .z..d. The analysis yielded a 
significant interaction for initial instruction by 
administration, £(3,67) = 3.97, ~ < .05. Subsequent 
ANACOVAs were conducted for each variable separately. 
The ANACOVAs for .z...s..I1.M and .z..d did not reveal any 
significant results. 
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The ANACOVA for the organizational variable .z...f 
indicated that subjects, regardless of psychiatric 
condition or initial instruction, tended to give fewer 
responses having organization (i.e., Z) on the second 
administration, E(l,73)=6.55, , ~ < .01, (see Table 3 
for means and standard deviations) . Hence, even when 
the total number of responses across administrations is 
controlled for as a covariate, the frequency of z 
responses decreases. This could suggest a decline in 
motivation or, perhaps, involvement in the task in that 
the subjects make less of an effort to organize 
different components of the blot on the second 
administration. 
In regard to human movement variables (i.e., M+, 
Mo, Mu, and M), there were very few individuals who had 
M+ responses which, when subjected to a MANACOVA, 
resulted in a lack of within-error variance and produced 
spurious results. Hence, the number of M+ and Mo 
responses were combined, as were the Mu and M-
responses. The MANACOVA revealed a significant effect 
for initial instruction (fake or standard first) by 
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administration (first or second), £(2,69)=3.83, , ~ < 
.05. Consequently, univariate tests were conducted 
which revealed a significant three way interaction for 
psychiatric status by initial instruction by 
administration only for M+ and Mo combined but not for 
Mu and M- as an aggregate, £(1,71)=5.39, ~ < .05 (see 
Table 4 for means and standard deviations) . No other 
effects were significant. Tukeys tests showed that 
nonpsychiatric subjects who received standard 
instructions initially, had significantly more M+ and Mo 
responses on the first administration compared to both 
psychiatric and nonpsychiatric subjects who initially 
received fake instructions, ~s <.05. In addition, the 
nonpsychiatric, standard-first subjects significantly 
decreased their number of responses on the second 
administration under fake instructions. No other 
comparisons were significant. 
The foregoing MANACOVA did reveal a marginally 
significant psychiatric status by initial instruction by 
administration interaction (i.e., ~ < .10). Hence, when 
combined with Mu and M- responses in the MANACOVA, 
differences for M+ and Mo were diluted. When examined 
via the univarite test, however, the findings were 
significant. 
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The MANACOVA for developmental quality (i.e., D..Q+, 
D..Qv/+, D..Qo, and D..Qv) produced a significant interaction 
for initial instruction by administration, £(2,70)=5.76, 
p < .05, with no other effects or interactions being 
significant. Separate ANACOVAs showed significant 
interactions for initial instruction by administration 
for D..Q+ and D..Qo but not for D..Qv/+ or D..Qv, £(1,71)=12.52, 
p < .01 and £(1,71)=11.20, ~ < .01, respectively (see 
Table 5 for means) . Tukeys tests showed that only 
subjects who initially gave responses under the fake 
instructional set significantly changed their number of 
D..Q+ responses (i.e., decreased across administrations) 
For D..Qo responses, on the other hand, Tukeys tests 
showed that both groups of subjects initially receiving 
either standard or fake instructions significantly 
changed their responses across administrations, ps < 
.05. Moreover, the two groups (i.e., fake first vs. 
standard first) significantly differed from each other 
for the number of D.Qo responses given on both 
administrations. Again, no other effects were 
significant. 
The MANACOVA for form quality (i.e., £.Qx+ and £.Qxo 
vs. £.Qxu and £.Qx-) produced a significant interaction 
for instructions by administration, £(2,70)=6.44, J;L< 
.01. No other effects or interactions were significant. 
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Univariate tests revealed that, for E.Qx+ and E.Qxo, 
individuals who gave "standard" responses on the first 
administration significantly decreased the number of 
"good" form quality-responses on the second, fake 
instructional set, £(1,71)=11.60, ~ < .01. This finding 
was demonstrated regardless of psychiatric condition 
(see Table 5 for means and standard deviations). Tukeys 
test confirmed this difference, and, in addition, showed 
that the two groups differed for the number of .EQA+/o 
responses on the first administration, ~ < .01. In 
contrast, subjects who initially gave responses under 
the fake instructional set did not significantly change 
the number of good form quality responses given under 
standard instructions on the second administration. 
Hence, it appears that both, psychiatric and 
nonpsychiatric, subjects significantly altered their 
responses in terms of good form quality when going from 
standard to fake responses but not from fake to 
standard. 
Consistent with the foregoing findings, the ANACOVA 
for combined E.Qxu and £QA- responses was significant for 
the initial instructions by administration interaction, 
£(1,71)=7.95, ~ < .01. Tukeys tests showed that the 
standard-first and fake-first groups differed on the 
first administration, ~ < .05. Only the fake-first 
group, however, significantly changed (i.e., decreased) 
their responses across trials (i.e., from fake to 
standard),~< .05 (see Table 5 for means). 
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When just pure form quality was considered (i.e., 
EQ.f.+ and EQ.f.o vs. E'.Q:!.u and .E:'.Qf-) the interaction for 
initial instruction by administration was once again the 
only significant statistical finding for the MANACOVA, 
£(2,70)=5.66, ~ < .01. For the EQ.f.+ and EQ.f.o combined 
indice, univariate tests confirmed the foregoing 
interaction, £(1,71)=11.17, ~ < .01 (see Table 5 for 
means) . The analysis for EQ.f.u and EQ.f.- did not reveal 
any significant differences. Tukeys tests showed that, 
for EQ.f.+ and E:Qf.o responses combined, the two groups 
depicted in Table 5 differed from each other on the 
first administration (i.e., subjects initially giving 
responses under standard instructions had better pure 
form quality than subjects initially giving responses 
under fake instructions) ~ < .05. Both instructional 
groups (i.e., standard-first and fake-first) going from 
fake to standard instructions significantly differed 
across administrations, ~s < .05. 
A MANACOVA examining the percentage of good and 
poor form quality relative to all answers (i.e., X+% and 
X-%) once again revealed only a significant interaction 
for initial instructions by administration, 
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£(2,71)=7.72, ~ < .01. An ANACOVA showed that, 
collapsed across psychiatric status, subjects who gave 
"fake" responses on the first administration had a lower 
X+% compared to their standard answers on the second 
administration, £(1,72)=14.85, ~ < .01, (see Table 5 for 
means) . Likewise, subjects who gave standard responses 
on the first administration had a higher X+% (see Table 
5) compared to the second administration on which they 
attempted to fake their answers. Hence, the foregoing 
interaction was significant, £(1,71)=13.90, ~ < .01, and 
the differences across administrations, as described, 
were corroborated by Tukeys tests, both ~s < .05. 
Furthermore, the two groups (i.e., fake-first and 
standard-first) differed from each other on the first 
trial; Tukey, ~ < .05. 
An ANACOVA showed similar results for X-% as with 
X+%. That is, subjects, regardless of psychiatric 
status, decreased their X-% score when going from fake 
to standard responses (see Table 5) . Likewise, subjects 
slightly increased their X-% s!core when going from 
standard to fake responses; the interaction was 
significant, £(1,72)=8.98, ~ < .01. Tukeys tests 
revealed both instructional gioups (standard-first and 
fake-first) altered their responses across 
administrations ~ < .05. The two groups also 
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significantly differed on the first administration, ~s < 
. 05. 
Separate MANACOVAs were performed on human and 
' 
animal content variables. Neither analysis produced 
significant results. A separate MANACOVA was performed 
on the remaining content variables which yielded a 
significant interaction for psychiatric status by 
administration, £(17,53)=1.83, ~ < .05. Separate 
univariate tests were conducted for each content 
variable and only three produced significant results. 
There was a significant change in responses across 
administration for both Fire, F(l,73)= 6.62, p < .05, 
and Food variables, E(l, 73)=8.56, ~ < .01 (see Table 3 
for means). In addition, for Household, there was a 
significant main effect for psychiatric status, 
E(l,71)=4.42, ~ < .05, showing that the nonpsychiatric 
group had more of such responses (M=0.81 ± 1.15) 
compared to the psychiatric group (M =0.46 ± 0.76) 
Interestingly, when several of the content 
variables were combined and analyzed as part of the 
Isolate Ratio, there was a significant psychiatric 
status by administration interaction, E(l,71)=6.38, ~ < 
.01. Tukey's tests, however, did not reveal significant 
differences among mean comparisons, hence, the 
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interaction did not appear to be a particularly strong 
one. 
The ANACOVA for WSUM6 (i.e., the sum of all special 
scores such as DV, INCOM, etc.) revealed a significant 
main effect for initial instruction, £(1,68)=4.41, ~ < 
.05, and a significant interaction for initial 
instruction by administration, collapsed across 
psychiatric status, £(1,70)=12.53, ~ < .01. No other 
ANACOVA main effects or interactions were significant. 
It appears that subjects who gave standard responses on 
the first administration had a lower WSUM6 score than on 
the second administration when they gave answers under 
the fake instructional set (see Table 5 for means) . The 
reverse was true for subjects initially "faking" their 
responses. The latter group decreased their WSUM6 score 
on the second administration on which they were to give 
answers under standard instructions. Tukeys tests 
revealed that the two groups (i.e., fake or standard 
instruction first) differed on the first administration 
for WSUM6, with the "fake" group having a higher score, 
~ < .05. Only the fake-first group, however, 
significantly changed (i.e., decreased) their WSUM6 
score from the first to the second administration. 
ANACOVAS on the Adjusted D score, and Lambda 
produced the same significant interactions relative to 
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the foregoing analysis. Specifically, regardless of 
psychiatric status, subjects who gave fake answers on 
the first administration significantly altered their 
Adjusted U score on the second administration (see Table 
5), £(1,71)=5.38, R < .05. Tukeys tests confirmed this 
difference, R < .05. In addition and based on Tukeys 
tests, the fake-first group had a lower Adjusted D score 
relative to the standard-first group on the first 
administration, R < .05. 
Similarly, for Lambda, individuals who "faked" 
first had a higher Lambda on the second administration 
on which they attempted to give "standard" answers (see 
Table 5), £(1,72)=4.47, R < .05. This finding was 
corroborated by Tukeys tests, R < .05. No other 
comparisons were significant. 
The ANACOVA for the Egocentricity demonstrated a 
significant interaction for psychiatric status by 
initial instruction, collapsed across administrations, 
£(1,70)=6.52, R < .01. Tukeys tests showed that 
psychiatric patients had a significantly lower 
Egocentricity score on the standard administration 
(M=0.25 ± 0.16) relative to the nonpsychiatric subjects 
(M=0.42 ± 0.16), R < .05. No other main effects or 
interactions were significant. 
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The ANACOVAs for the Suicide Constellation, 
Depression Index, and Schizophrenia Index all produced 
significant interactions for initial instruction by 
administration. For the Suicide Constellation, 
£(1,71)=14.90, ~ < .01, Tukeys tests revealed that the 
fake-first and standard-first instructional groups 
differed on the first and secbnd administrations (see 
Table 5 for means) . Furthermore, both groups 
significantly changed their responses in the expected 
direction. That is, the standard-first group shifted 
upward on the second, "faked" trial, and the fake-first 
group decreased their score on the standard 
administration, all ~s < .05. 
For the above-mentioned interaction on the 
Depression Index, £(1,71)=14.74, ~ < .01, Tukeys tests 
showed that the standard-first and fake-first 
instructional groups differed from each other on both 
trials (see Table 5), but only the fake-first group 
significantly changed their responses (i.e., decreased) 
across administrations, ~s < .05. There was also a 
significant main effect for ps;Ychiatric status, 
£(1,69)=4.65, ~ < .05. Specifically, the Depression 
Index was slightly higher for the psychiatric group 
(M=l.22 ± 0.89) relative to the nonpsychiatric group 
(M=l.00 ± 0.79), collapsed across all other conditions. 
There was also a significant main effect for 
administration, £(1,71)=7.02, J;L< .05, demonstrating 
that, regardless of group constraints, subjects tended 
to decrease their scores from the first (M=l.26 ± 0.91) 
to the second administration (M=0.95 ± 0.85). 
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When examined via Tukeys tests, the interaction for 
the Schizophrenia Index, £(1,71)=6.93, R < .01, did not 
prove to be a particularly strong effect. The post-hoc 
tests revealed only a marginally significant difference 
between the standard-first and fake-first groups on the 
first administration, R < .10 (see Table 5). 
As previously discussed, individuals may be able to 
produce changes across instructional sets of a magnitude 
to yield statistical differences, but these changes may 
not be of the degree to alter clinical judgments. 
Hence, the foregoing significant changes across trials 
were compared to standard deviations for the respective 
variables as found in Exner's Comprehensive System 
(1986) . This system provides normative data generated 
from protocols of 600 nonpatient adults and is used in 
the analysis of individual protocols and the 
interpretation process. Scores that differ from the 
normative mean by a standard deviation or more are 
considered significant and frequently yield different 
interpretations compared to scores closer to the mean. 
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It was found that only the significant changes 
across trials for X+%, X-%, and WSUM6, as previously 
described, exceeded the magnitude equivalent to a 
standard deviation or more based on the Exner norms. 
Hence, it may be said that, although subjects as a whole 
did significantly alter their responses on many 
variables per instructional set, there were few changes 
large enough that might produce changes in clinical 
judgment. 
Judges' Task. Demographic characteristics of 
judges are displayed in Table 6. In order to ensure 
that the different sets of protocols was not a 
significant source of variance, this factor (i.e., 
stimulus set) was included in the analyses of judges' 
ratings. Judges' (n=30) ratings as to whether they 
thought protocols were administered under fake or 
standard instructions were submitted to a 2 (informed 
vs. uninformed judges) X 2 (stimulus set) X 2 
(psychiatric vs. nonpsychiatric protocol) X 2 (fake or 
standard protocol) ANOVA. There was no significant 
effect for stimulus set, hence, it can be said that the 
different groups of protocols were equivalent. 
There was a significant main effect for fake vs. 
standard protocols, E(l,26)=8.69, ~ < .05. The only 
significant interaction was for psychiatric status by 
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type of protocol (i.e., fake or standard). That is, 
judges differentially rated (i.e., l=given under faked 
instructions; 7=given under standard instructions) 
psychiatric and nonpsychiatric protocols when they were 
given under standard or fake instructions, 
~(1,26)=28.23, ~ < .01, (see Table 7 for means and 
standard deviations) . Tukeys tests revealed that 
ratings for the protocols of nonpsychiatric patients 
given under standard instructions were higher (i.e., 
judges thought them to be more likely given under 
standard instructions) than the protocols of 
nonpsychiatric and psychiatric patients given under fake 
instructions, ~s< .05 and psychiatric patients given 
under standard instruction, ~ < .05. No other 
comparisons were significant. Hence, it appears that 
judges could distinguish between standard and "faked" 
protocols of nonpsychiatric patients but were not able 
to do so between those of psychiatric patients. 
To further examine judges' decision making ability 
in regard to determining the protocols authenticity, 
they were classified into more and less experienced 
groups. Judges having more than 10 years of experience 
with the Rorschach were categorized as being more 
experienced (n=14) and those having less than 10 years 
were designated as less experienced (n = 16). An ANOVA 
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was conducted on their ability to detect faked 
protocols. The analysis did not reveal any significant 
results. Hence, experience did not seem to be an 
important factor affecting the present decision making 
in regard to differentiating faked from standard 
protocols. 
The judges' ratings (i. e., l=very important and 
7=very unimportant) of various factors affecting their 
decisions (e.g., content, ratios, etc.) were examined in 
an omnibus MANOVA. This analysis revealed significant 
main effects for psychiatric status, £(8,21)=2.55, R < 
. 05, and instructional set (i.e., fake or standard), 
£(8,21)=3.845, R < .01. The interaction for psychiatric 
status by instructional set was also significant, 
£(8,21)=2,87, R < .05. Consequently separate ANOVAs 
were conducted for each factor (e.g., content, etc.). 
Judges rated several indices differentially 
relative to the protocols identified above (i.e., 
psychiatric-fake, psychiatric-standard, nonpsychiatric-
standard, and nonpsychiatric-fake) . For example, it was 
found that judges said they weighed content more heavily 
in their decision as to whether a protocol was authentic 
if the protocol was actually given under standard 
instructions, £(1,28)=4.29, R < .05, (see Table 8 for 
means). No other effects were significant for content. 
There was, however, a significant main effect showing 
that judges weighed ratios more heavily in their 
decision about standard than faked protocols, 
£(1,28)=8.15, ~ < .01 (see Table 8 for means). 
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Form quality (i.e., E.Qx) was rated as being a more 
significant determinant in ratings (i.e., determining 
the authenticity of the protocol) for nonpsychiatric 
compared to psychiatric protocols, £(1,28)=5.75, ~ < .05 
(see Table 9 for means). Similarly, judges tended to 
rate the ratios as being more important in determining 
the authenticity of the psychiatric relative to 
nonpsychiatric protocols, £(1,28)=13.07, ~ < .01 (see 
Table 9 for means) . 
For the Suicide Constellation, there was a 
significant main effect for fake vs. standard protocols, 
£(1,28)=8.93, ~ < .01, and a significant interaction for 
psychiatric status by initial instruction, 
£(1,27)=18.62, ~ < .05. Judges rated the Suicide 
Constellation as being more important in determining the 
authenticity of the faked compared to standard protocols 
(see Table 8 for means). Furthermore, in regard to the 
interaction, Tukeys tests revealed that the Suicide 
Constellation was rated as being more important in 
making a determination as to the authenticity of the 
nonpsychiatric, faked protocols relative to the 
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nonpsychiatric, standard protocols, ~ < .05 (see Table 7 
for means). No other comparisons were significant. 
There were no significant findings for location, 
determinants, special scores, or sequence of responses. 
Of particular note was the lack of any significant 
effects for information provided to the judges. 
In order to examine how the protocols might differ 
from each other, a descriptive comparison was made 
between the psychiatric-standard, psychiatric-fake, 
nonpsychiatric-fake and nonpsychiatric-standard 
protocols. Although no statistical comparisons were 
possible due to the limited number, the protocols did 
appear to differ on a number of indices. Compared to 
the nonpsychiatric faked protocols, the nonpsychiatric 
standard protocols had fewer responses overall and 
proportionately fewer Blends, more human responses, 
fewer Blood and Sex responses, fewer Em and m 
responses, fewer Color and FC' responses, a lower WSUM6 
score, a lower Suicide Constellation score, and better 
form quality (i.e., X+% and X-%). See Table 10 for 
means. The psychiatric protocols, on the other hand, 
were very similar on these indices. 
Judges were also asked to rate the protocol as to 
the level of adjustment it may reflect (i.e., l=very 
well adjusted; 7=very maladjusted). Some of the judges, 
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however, indicated confusion as to whether they were to 
rate the person's level of adjustment based on the 
protocol, despite it possibly being faked, or to rate 
the person "behind'' the protocol if they did think it 
was faked. Hence, it was uncertain as to whether all 
judges performed the task with the same understanding. 
Consequently, these ratings were omitted from analysis. 
Discussion 
There was substantial evidence demonstrating that 
subjects apparently can alter their Rorschach responses 
as a function of instructional set. Subjects who 
received either standard or "fake" instructions (i.e., 
. "try to appear criminally insane . .") on the 
first trial and the opposite instructions on the second 
one were able to make changes on many indices across 
administrations. To summarize, the changes across 
administrations for at least one of the instructional 
groups (i.e., standard-first vs. fake-first) achieved 
statistical significance for the following variables: 
1) D..Q+; D..Qo 2) .E:.Qx+ and .E:.Qxo combined; .E:.Qxu and .E:.Qx-
combined, 3) .EQ.f+ and .EQ.fo combined, 4) x.±%; X=.%, 5) 
Lambda, 6) M+ and Mo combined, 7) Adjusted D, 8) WSUM6, 
9) Depression Index, and 10) Suicide Constellation. 
Most of the changes for the foregoing variables 
were in a direction that might be expected, given the 
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type of instruction. For example, individuals who 
received instructions to "fake" their responses on the 
first administration significantly lowered their WSUM6 
score on the second, standard-instruction trial which 
would make them appear less pathological. Similarly, 
individuals initially receiving standard instructions 
significantly increased their score on the Suicide 
Constellation when giving responses under fake 
instructions. At first glance, however, it appears that 
the Adjusted D score changed in the opposite direction 
across administrations than might be expected (i.e., the 
standard-first group had a lower Adjusted D score on the 
second administration in which they were asked to "fake" 
than on the first administration on which they were to 
give standard responses; the fake-first group had a 
higher Adjusted D score on the second administration 
when they were to give "standard" responses than on the 
first trial when they were to give "fake" responses) . 
The Adjusted D is a recalculation of the D score 
and attempts to provide information about a person's 
perceived demands and coping resources by extracting 
variables that are sensitive to transient stress (i.e., 
all but one of the inanimate movement and shading 
variables are omitted in the calculation) . A possible 
explanation for the subjects' Adjusted D score being 
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higher per the "standard" than "fake" instructions may 
be that when a person is asked to give their "true" 
responses, it may produce heightened situational 
anxiety. This anxiety may result in a greater number of 
inanimate movement and shadin~ responses than under 
"faked" instructions, thereby causing a higher Adjusted 
D score. 
Table 5 contains other similar findings (i.e., 
differential changes across ad.ministrations per 
instructional set) which are particularly striking in 
that it is assumed that subjects would not know on which 
variables they should alter their responses to comply 
with the instructional set. !n fact, previous studies 
investigating similar questions in regard to malingering 
have found subjects to focus predominantly on changing 
content, although most of the prior work has not 
involved the use of the Exner Comprehensive Scoring 
System. 
It is also important to note that there were 
indices which were not susceptible to change contingent 
upon instruction. Most of the single determinants 
(i.e., shading variables; color) were not significantly 
altered across administrations. It is also important to 
underscore that, for most variables that were 
significantly changed across trials, the magnitude of 
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difference was less than the standard deviation for 
those indices relative to normative data for 
nonpsychiatric individuals (Exner, 1986) . The only 
exceptions were for X+%, X-%, and WSUM6. Hence, only 
for the latter variables was the change per 
instructional set perhaps large enough to alter clinical 
judgment, as previously explained. 
Previous studies examining the ability of subjects 
to change their Rorschach responses per instructional 
set has been mixed. There does not appear to be a 
consistent pattern in methodology that covaries with 
success in changing scores. Nevertheless, there was one 
methodological difference in the present study relative 
to many prior ones in that productivity (i.e., R) was 
controlled for statistically in measuring changes. 
Hence, many of the prior studies may have found more 
significant differences if productivity was held 
constant across administrations. 
Another methodological difference relative to 
previous studies concerns the type of instructions used 
to promote malingering. Previous studies, as noted in 
the introduction, have ranged from telling the subject 
to merely "misrepresent" themselves to educating them as 
to the role of being a schizophrenic patient. 
Obviously, the difference in instructional sets may be 
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an important variable in influencing subjects' 
responding and warrants further investigation. Of 
particular importance in future research would be to 
more closely examine the nature of subjects' assumed 
strategies via post-experimental inquiries. Such an 
approach might identify different strategies that could 
then be contrasted and compared experimentally. 
In addition to examining subjects' ability to alter 
their responses across administration, it is also 
important to look at between group differences (i.e., 
how subjects differed in regard to responses with 
respect to fake vs. standard instructions). That is, 
for what indices are there between-group differences as 
a function of receiving either standard or fake 
instructions? Most of these differences occurred on the 
first administration, as seen in Table 5. For example, 
individuals giving "standard" responses first had higher 
scores for D.Qo, E..Qx+ and E..Qxo, E..Qf+ and E..Qfo, and X+% 
compared to subjects giving "fake" responses first, as 
might be expected. Conversely, the standard-first 
subjects, on the first trial, had lower scores for E..Qxu 
and E..Qx-, X-%, WSUM6, Suicide Constellation, and 
Depression Index relative to the fake-first group. 
There were related between-group differences on the 
second administration, as seen in Table 5. 
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Although there were several statistical differences 
between the fake- and standard-first protocols on a 
number of indices, scores on the first trial for fake-
first subjects do not appear to be distinctive enough to 
set them apart from ordinary protocols. That is, the 
group scores for the fake-first group on the first 
administration are essentially consistent with a 
psychiatric profile. Hence, although many scores 
between fake- and standard-first groups are different, 
the indices for the group might not be detected as 
unauthentic. 
Psychiatric status did not appear to be a 
significant factor affecting results. There were only 
three indices, the Egocentricity and Depression Indexes, 
and the Human Movement determinant that yielded 
differential findings between the psychiatric and 
nonpsychiatric groups. It is not surprising that that 
psychiatric patients, may be more depressed than the 
nonpsychiatric group and that their emotional state 
could not be overridden by instructional sets. It is 
also not unusual that the psychiatric group would have 
lower Egocentricity scores compared to the 
nonpsychiatric group in that Exner norms for this index 
is lower for psychiatric than for nonpsychiatric 
populations (Exner, 1986). 
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Perhaps of more importance in regard to psychiatric 
status is the finding that nonpsychiatric subjects were 
able to alter human movement variables (i.e., M+ and Mo 
combined) across administrations (i.e., going from the 
standard-first administration to the fake-second 
administration) to a greater degree compared to the 
psychiatric subjects. This firtding supports the original 
hypothesis (i.e., ... "nonpsychiatric subjects will be 
able to alter their responses to a greater degree across 
administrations as compared to the psychiatric 
subjects"). 
Nonpsychiatric subjects may have been able to give 
"good" human movement responses and then, on the second 
trial, decrease the frequency of such responses due to 
their level of ego functioning. As stated previously, 
nonpsychiatric subjects' may have a greater level of 
boundary differentiation than psychiatric subjects which 
allows them more flexibility and adaptability in 
responding (Kernberg, 1967; 1970). In other words, it 
may be that nonpsychiatric subjects were able to "take 
distance" from the inkblots, and therefore, alter their 
human movement responses on the second administration 
under the "faked" condition. 
Based on the foregoing reasoning, however, the 
question remains as to why the nonpsychiatric subjects 
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were not able to successfully alter their human movement 
responses across administrations when they initially 
received fake rather than standard instructions. That 
is, why was the nonpsychiatric group unsuccessful in 
altering human movement (M+ and Mo) responses across 
administrations when asked to "fake" on the first trial 
and then, alternatively, told to give "standard" 
responses on the second trial? After all, subjects, 
regardless of psychiatric status, were able to alter 
their responses across trials on a number of other 
indices. A possible explanation for this finding may 
gleaned from object relations theory. 
There is evidence to suggest that the human 
movement variable is a measurement of object 
representation and interpersonal relationships (Blatt, 
1974; Mayman, 1968) . If this is true, then it is 
plausible to assume that because the "interpersonal 
pull" of the human movement variable is so strong, the 
duration between administrations in this study might not 
have allowed enough time for the nonpsychiatric subjects 
to adequately shore up their defenses in order to give 
good form quality human movement responses on the second 
administration. In other words, it may be a more 
difficult task to alter human movement responses across 
administrations when nonpsychiatric subjects' first 
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''ruin" human movement responses and then try to 
reconstitute to give human movement responses with good 
form quality than it is to give good responses initially 
and then try to to ruin them. It would be interesting to 
see if nonpsychiatric subjects', initially given fake 
instructions, would differentially alter their human 
movement responses per instructional set as a function 
varying the test-retest interval. That is, could 
nonpsychiatric subjects alter their responses to a 
greater degree if there were a two hour time delay, 24 
hour time delay, or a week delay or more? 
Based on the foregoing reasoning, it also makes 
sense that psychiatric subjects would have a limited 
capacity for "good" object relations, thereby making it 
difficult for them to alter their human movement 
responses per instructional set. If one does not have 
the capacity for good object representation, how could 
one produce the derivative of that construct on the 
Rorschach? In addition, it seems tenable that because 
this variable has a strong interpersonal valence, 
psychiatric patients may have experienced a "loss of 
boundaries" and failure in ego functioning which would 
not permit them to take proper "distance" from the 
inkblot. The result may have been their inability to 
alter human movement responses even to a marginal 
degree, which was the case in this study. 
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With the exception of the human movement variable, 
there were no statistical differences between 
psychiatric and nonpsychiatric subjects in their ability 
to alter responses as a function of instructions. That 
is, contrary to the original hypothesis, psychiatric 
subjects were not found to differ from nonpsychiatric 
subjects in their ability to change responses across 
instructional set. This finding is not consistent with 
previous literature which has demonstrated psychiatric 
patients to be less adept than nonpsychiatric subjects 
in modifying Rorschach responses (Fabricant, 1953). 
The lack of more significant effects for 
psychiatric status may be the result of not controlling 
for the psychiatric patients' level of dysfunction. 
That is, in the present study, there was no assurance 
that the inpatient participants were psychologically 
impaired enough to be distinctive relative to 
nonpsychiatric subjects. Future studies in this regard 
may benefit from establishing the dysfunctional level of 
psychiatric patients via psychometric and/or clinical 
ratings. Specifically, it would be advisable to give 
psychiatric patients an MMPI, GAS rating, and/or a 
clinical interview in order to ensure their level of 
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psychopathology is severe and uniform enough to warrant 
inclusion in the psychiatric subject group. 
In regard to psychiatric status, it is worth noting 
that three of the four subjects' data who were excluded 
from the analyses, as previously mentioned, were in the 
psychiatric group. Their expressed confusion about the 
task may be a reflection of an inability to alter their 
responses due to their level of psychological 
dysfunction and not merely the result of a lack of 
clarity as to their role in the experiment. That is, 
perhaps the patients' expressed confusion was a function 
of their "loss of boundaries" due to their psychiatric 
status. Unfortunately, the examiners did not make 
specific notation that might be helpful in clarifying 
this issue. 
Statistical results aside, the controversy that 
exists in the literature pertaining to the 
susceptibility of the Rorschach to malingering seems to 
suffer from a need for clarification. Specifically, how 
would researchers ever know if a person had malingered 
their Rorschach responses unless there existed the 
person's "true" Rorschach responses to which to compare 
or some type of universal. "malingered profile" to be 
used as a referent. If it is possible for a group of 
subjects to change their responses, however, it seems 
60 
reasonable to assume that, if so desired, one could 
produce responses that might not be representative of 
their "true" protocol. The present study has 
demonstrated that, as a group, subjects were able to 
alter their responses within a short interval of time to 
an extent that achieved statistical significance. 
Hence, the present study suggests that a repeated-
measures design is a viable methodology in terms of 
looking at subjects' ability to alter responses across 
administration. 
Based on the foregoing commentary and results of 
the first study (i.e.,subjects' responses per 
instructional set), it appears difficult to say what 
might be helpful information to clinical experts in 
detecting an individual's malingering on the Rorschach. 
Nevertheless, it is encouraging that, on the second 
study, judges were able to significantly differentiate 
between faked and standard protocols for nonpsychiatric 
subjects. Based on an examination of protocols, it 
appears that judges may have (knowingly or unknowingly) 
attended to differences in the number of blood and sex 
responses. That is, the nonpsychiatric, faked protocols 
appeared to have significantly more of these types of 
responses than the nonpsychiatric standard protocols 
(see Table 10). In addition, the nonpsychiatric faked 
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protocols had more special scores than the 
nonpsychiatric standard protocols (see the WSUM6 score 
in Table 10) . Hence, consistent with previous research 
(Feldman & Graley, 1954), judges may have attended to 
response categories that made the nonpsychiatric faked 
protocols appear more "dramatic" than the nonpsychiatric 
standard protocols. 
It is surprising, therefore, that the judges did 
not rate Special Scores (e.g., Incoms, etc.) as being 
differentially helpful in making their decisions 
concerning authenticity. Consistent with the 
descriptive analysis of the protocols utilized in the 
judges' task, however, experts did note that content 
contributed significantly to their decision making to 
the point of reaching statistical significance. A 
comparison of psychiatric protocols (i.e., psychiatric 
standard and psychiatric fake) in Table 10 shows that 
they were much less distinctive from each other relative 
to the foregoing indices that distinguished 
nonpsychiatric protocols. Hence, the judges may have 
had more difficulty discerning the authenticity between 
psychiatric protocols due to a lack of contrast between 
them. Consequently, the demand characteristics of the 
task (i.e., allowing judges to compare and contrast 
protocols) may have significantly influenced their 
authenticity ratings in a different way than if the 
judges were given a single protocol. 
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In addition to content, judges differentially 
weighted the Suicide Constellation and ratios as being 
important, when their ratings of standard and faked 
protocols were compared. To clarify, without knowledge 
of whether a protocol was actually standard or fake, 
judges said they placed differential importance on the 
Suicide Constellation and ratios when making decisions 
as to the authenticity of the protocols. It must be 
realized that what a clinician says he or she attends to 
may be entirely different than to what information they 
actually utilize in their decision making. That is, 
judges may overrate the complexity of their decision-
making and say they weigh various information heavily, 
when, in actuality, they are only attending to a smaller 
set of data. One way to more closely examine judges' 
decision making is to make comparisons between what 
judges say is important in differentiating faked from 
standard protocols and what indices statistically 
distinguish between such protocols. Unfortunately, the 
small number of protocols used in the present study 
limits any type of discriminant analysis of this sort. 
Furthermore, given the prohibitive amount of work 
required of volunteer judges, it is unlikely this 
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approach will prove practical in future research 
endeavors. 
Continuing with the discussion of the judges' 
decision-making, it is surprising that non-Rorschach 
information (e.g., demographics, etc.) about the subject 
or differential clinical experience with the Rorschach 
did not appear to have a significant effect on judges' 
ability to detect faking. It is possible, of course, 
that there were too few protocols utilized for such 
information to have a significant impact upon decision-
making. If the type of information used in the present 
study is not helpful in differentiating between faked 
and standard protocols, it may be asked what type of 
non-Rorschach input might be valuable? It would be 
interesting for future research to examine the effect of 
being able to view the examinee providing responses. 
Specifically, the examinees' nonverbal behavior (e.g., 
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body posture, voice intonation, etc.) may prove to be 
critical in assisting clinicians to discern malingered 
protocols. 
Finally in regard to judges' decision-making, the 
external validity of the present task must be examined. 
The present study did show that judges could 
successfully discriminate between faked and standard 
protocols for nonpsychiatric subjects. It must be 
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pointed out, however, that judges were sensitized to the 
possibility that the protocols they were examining may 
have been faked. Hence, this may have created implicit 
base-rate information, and made their task much easier 
than when a clinician may, unknowingly, encounter an 
examinee who is malingering. It may be helpful for 
future research to examine the effects of base-rate 
information on judges' (e.g., informing them the ratio 
of faked to standard protocols, etc.) ability to detect 
unauthentic protocols and further scrutinize what types 
of information are helpful to clinicians in making these 
decisions. 
In the meantime, the present study offers some 
helpful information that may assist clinicians in 
detecting malingering on the Rorschach. Although the 
present study demonstrated that subjects could alter 
their responses to a point that achieved statistical 
significance, on only a few indices (i.e., X+%, X-%, and 
WSUM6) did the magnitude of change match or exceed a 
standard deviation based on Exner norms for the 
respective indices. Statistically, it appears that form 
quality and elevated Special Scores may help most in 
raising doubt as to the authenticity of a protocol. In 
terms of judges' own descriptions of their decision 
making, it appears that they focus on content, the 
Suicide Constellation, and ratios in determining the 
authenticity of a protocol. The upshot for the 
practicing clinician is to be alert and beware. 
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Table 1 
Demographic Characteristics of Subjects (Means and 
Standard Deviations) 
Age 
IQ 
Education 
Marital 
married 
divorced 
widowed 
single 
Sex 
male 
female 
Employment 
unemployed 
employed 
disabled 
retired 
Means 
Psychiatric 
43.75 ± 
101.22 ± 
11.71 ± 
17 
10 
2 
11 
39 
1 
22 
9 
3 
6 
14.03 
6.80 
1. 28 
Standard Deviations 
Nonpsychiatric 
48.82 ± 
111.60 ± 
13.37 ± 
27 
5 
0 
8 
39 
1 
2 
28 
3 
7 
17.76 
11.40* 
2.13* 
Table 2 
Mean Scores and Standard Deviations per Subject 
Condition 
Variable 
R 
Zf 
ZSUM 
PS 
PF 
NPS 
NPF 
PS 
PF 
NPS 
NPF 
PS 
PF 
NPS 
NPF 
Administration 
19.50 ± 6.22 
14.95 ± 5.03 
1 7. 95 ± 9.47 
17.20 ± 4.27 
10.53 ± 3.48 
9.94 ± 4.16 
11.00 ± 3.74 
11.60 ± 4.50 
30.29 ± 12.67 
31.06 ± 16.56 
35.03 ± 15.23 
36.42 ± 15.89 
1 Administration 
14.83 ± 5.19 
15.26 ± 6.31 
15.10 ± 10.63 
16.40 ± 4.41 
8.59 ± 2.78 
11.00 ± 3.74 
8.84 ± 3.72 
9.20 ± 3.24 
25.22 ± 11.46 
25.64 ± 11.94 
28.64 ± 12.41 
28.39 ± 11.16 
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2 
Table 2 
Variable 
Zd 
POP 
Pairs 
#Blends 
w 
(continued) 
PS 
PF 
NPS 
NPF 
PS 
PF 
NPS 
NPF 
PS 
PF 
NPS 
NPF 
PS 
PF 
NPS 
NPF 
PS 
PF 
NPS 
NPF 
Administration 
-1.82 ± 4.06 
0.17 ± 4.30 
-1.32 ± 4.76 
-0.35 ± 5.82 
4.50 ± 2.21 
2.65 ± 1. 64 
4.40 ± 2.41 
4.71 ± 2.28 
4.85 ± 3.41 
4.10 ± 2.43 
7.35 ± 6.29 
7.18 ± 6.49 
3.75 ± 2.97 
2.65 ± 2.39 
3.55 ± 2.60 
3.18 ± 2.55 
8.78 ± 3.69 
8.05 ± 3.60 
7.95 ± 2.76 
8.80 ± 3.74 
1 Administration 
0.41 ± 4.73 
-1.11 ± 5.44 
1. 69 ± 4.90 
0.15 ± 3.58 
2.61 ± 2.30 
3. 26 ± 1. 41 
2.37 ± 2.27 
2.41 ± 2.40 
3.11 ± 2.95 
4.58 ± 3.25 
6.00 ± 6.69 
5.82 ± 6.97 
2.89 ± 1.84 
2.47 ± 1.77 
3.26 ± 2.86 
3.12 ± 3.00 
7.72 ± 3.20 
6.74 ± 3.60 
6. 63 ± 1. 98 
7.10 ± 2.63 
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Table 2 
Variable 
D 
Dd 
s 
H 
(continued) 
PS 
PF 
NPS 
NPF 
PS 
PF 
NPS 
NPF 
PS 
PF 
NPS 
NPF 
PS 
PF 
NPS 
NPF 
Administration 
8.50 ± 6.07 
5.53 ± 4.07 
8.58 ± 8.04 
7.10 ± 3.49 
1.22 ± 1.48 
0. 95 ± 1. 43 
1.11 ± 1.94 
1.15 ± 2. 03 
2.61 ± 1. 85 
2.26 ± 2.40 
1. 63 ± 2.11 
2.05 ± 2.26 
1. 89 ± 1. 97 
1. 68 ± 2.36 
2.32 ± 1.38 
2.15 ± 1. 72 
1 Administration 
5.72 ± 4.14 
7.63 ± 5.07 
7.16 ± 8.13 
7.85 ± 3.96 
0.94 ± 1.21 
0.74 ± 1.45 
0.84 ± 1.89 
0.87 ± 1.46 
1.78 ± 1.70 
1.16 ± 1. 64 
1. 58 ± 2.84 
1. 55 ± 1. 70 
1. 72 ± 1. 78 
1. 68 ± 1. 53 
1.68 ± 1.33 
2.20 ± 1. 73 
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Table 2 
Variable 
(H) 
Hd 
(Hd) 
A 
(continued) 
PS 
PF 
NPS 
NPF 
PS 
PF 
NPS 
NPF 
PS 
PF 
NPS 
NPF 
PS 
PF 
NPS 
NPF 
Administration 
0.83 ± 1.15 
0.58 ± 0.61 
0.68 + 1.11 
0.80 ± 1. 06 
0.72 ± 0.96 
0.47 ± 0.61 
0.95 ± 1.27 
0.50 ± 0.69 
0.56 ± 1.89 
0.16 ± 0.37 
0.21 ± 0.53 
0.55 ± 1.64 
6.72 ± 3.82 
5.39 ± 2.98 
5.95 ± 2.57 
5.55 ± 2.14 
1 Administration 
0.72 ± 0.96 
0.47 ± 0.61 
0.95 ± 1. 27 
0.50 ± 0.68 
0.44 ± 0.62 
0.79 ± 1.08 
0. 63 ± 1. 0 6 
0.90 ± 0.71 
0.50 ± 1.65 
0.16 ± 0.50 
0.05 ± 0.23 
0.10 ± 0.31 
4.78 ± 3.32 
6.16 ± 3.55 
4.95 ± 4.22 
5.80 ± 2.67 
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Table 2 
Variable 
(A) 
Ad 
(Ad) 
Ab 
(continued) 
Administration 
PS 
PF 
NPS 
NPF 
PS 
PF 
NPS 
NPF 
PS 
PF 
NPS 
NPF 
PS 
PF 
NPS 
NPF 
0.39 ± 0.61 
0.58 ± 0.96 
0.53 ± 0.70 
0.70 ± 0.92 
1.67 ± 1.81 
1.37 ± 1.50 
1.63 ± 1.12 
1.30 ± 1.17 
0.56 ± 0.24 
0.53 ± 0.23 
0.00 ± 0.00 
0.00 ± 0.00 
0.15 ± 0.37 
0.15 ± 0.49 
0.15 ± 0.59 
0.18 ± 0.53 
1 Administration 
0.39 ± 0.61 
0.53 ± 0.61 
0.79 ± 0.98 
0.55 ± 0.76 
0.89 ± 1.23 
1.47 ± 1.50 
1.16 ± 1.21 
1.55 ± 1.28 
0.17 ± 0.38 
0.10 ± 0.31 
0.53 ± 0.23 
0.00 ± 0.00 
0.39 ± 0.61 
0.05 ± 0.23 
0.16 ± 0.50 
0.18 ± 0.53 
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Table 2 
Variable 
Al 
An 
Art 
Ay 
(continued) 
PS 
PF 
NPS 
NPF 
PS 
PF 
NPS 
NPF 
PS 
PF 
NPS 
NPF 
PS 
PF 
NPS 
NPF 
Administration 
0.00 ± 0.00 
0.00 ± 0.00 
0.00 ± 0.00 
0.00 ± 0.00 
0.50 ± 1.04 
0.58 ± 0.69 
0.58 ± 0.69 
0. 80 ± 1.14 
0.11 ± 0.32 
0.21 ± 0.53 
0.21 ± 0.42 
0.10 ± 0.45 
0.11 ± 0.32 
0.00 ± 0.00 
0.32 ± 0.75 
0.10 ± 0.31 
1 Administration 
0.00 ± 0.00 
0.00 ± 0.00 
0.00 ± 0.00 
0.00 ± 0.00 
0.33 ± 0.59 
0.74±1.56 
0.63 ± 0.89 
0.45 ± 0.94 
0.28 ± 0.57 
0.05 ± 0.23 
0.26 ± 0.93 
0.45 ± 0.69 
0.17 ± 0.51 
0.53 ± 0.23 
0.26 ± 0.56 
0.40 ± 0.82 
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Table 2 
Variable 
Bl 
Bt 
Cg 
Cl 
(continued) 
PS 
PF 
NPS 
NPF 
PS 
PF 
NPS 
NPF 
PS 
PF 
NPS 
NPF 
PS 
PF 
NPS 
NPF 
Administration 
0.28 ± 0.75 
0.95 ± 0.98 
0.21 ± 0.54 
1.20 ± 1.20 
1.72 ± 1.84 
0.53 ± 1.02 
1.05 ± 1.50 
1.30 ± 1.56 
0.44 ± 0.70 
0.21 ± 0.42 
0.63 ± 0.89 
0.75 ± 0.79 
0.28 ± 0.67 
0.05 ± 0.23 
0.10 ± 0.31 
0.40 ± 0.68 
1 Administration 
0.83 ± 1. 04 
0.53 ± 0.84 
0.89 ± 1.15 
0.15 ± 0.49 
1.28 ± 1.90 
0.95 ± 1.27 
0. 58 ± 1. 1 7 
1.05 ± 1.40 
0.33 ± 0.59 
0.21 ± 0.53 
0.37 ± 0.60 
0.35 ± 0.59 
0.22 ± 0.55 
0.16 ± 0.37 
0.10 ± 0.31 
0.20 ± 0.41 
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Table 2 
Variable 
Ex 
Fi 
Fd 
Ge 
(continued) 
PS 
PF 
NPS 
NPF 
PS 
PF 
NPS 
NPF 
PS 
PF 
NPS 
NPF 
PS 
PF 
NPS 
NPF 
Administration 
0.61 ± 0.85 
0.26 ± 0.73 
0.16 ± 0.37 
0.45 ± 0.83 
0.44 ± 0.62 
0.32 ± 0.82 
0.42 ± 0.61 
0.55 ± 0.60 
0.00 ± 0.00 
0.05 ± 0.23 
0.16 ± 0.50 
0.15 ± 0.37 
0.06 ± 0.24 
0.05 ± 0.23 
0.26 ± 0.56 
0.00 ± 0.00 
1 Administration 
0.33 ± 0.59 
0.10 ± 0.31 
0.21 ± 0.42 
0.22 ± 0.48 
0.11 ± 0.32 
0.10 ± 0.31 
0.21 ± 0.53 
0.30 ± 0.73 
0.28 ± 0.57 
0.21 ± 0.42 
0.10 ± 0.46 
0.45 ± 0.83 
0.11 ± 0.32 
0.00 ± 0.00 
0.16 ± 0.50 
0.00 ± 0.00 
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Table 2 
Variable 
Hh 
Ls 
Na 
Sc 
(continued) 
PS 
PF 
NPS 
NPF 
PS 
PF 
NPS 
NPF 
PS 
PF 
NPS 
NPF 
PS 
PF 
NPS 
NPF 
Administration 
0.67 ± 0.77 
0.26 ± 0.56 
1.05 ± 1.35 
0.65 ± 0.81 
0.28 ± 0.75 
0.42 ± 0.61 
0.53 ± 0.77 
0.50 ± 0.76 
1.00 ± 2.40 
0.37 ± 1.01 
0.58 ± 1.02 
0.55 ± 0.83 
0.56 ± 1.04 
0.32 ± 0.75 
0.79 ± 1.44 
0.45 ± 0.83 
1 Administration 
0.56 ± 0.98 
0.37 ± 0.68 
0.79 ± 1.27 
0.75 ± 1.12 
0.33 ± 0.69 
0.53 ± 0.84 
0.26 ± 0.45 
0. 80 ± 1.15 
0.50 ± 0.98 
0.42 ± 0.77 
0.26 ± 0.73 
0.40 ± 0.75 
0.17 ± 0.38 
0.21 ± 0.42 
0.42 ± 1.39 
0.20 ± 0.52 
----- -
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Table 2 
Variable 
Sx 
Xy 
DQ+ 
DQv/+ 
(continued) 
PS 
PF 
NPS 
NPF 
PS 
PF 
NPS 
NPF 
PS 
PF 
NPS 
NPF 
PS 
PF 
NPS 
NPF 
Administration 
0.33 ± 0.59 
0.68 ± 1. 56 
0.16 ± 0.37 
0.75 ± 1. 74 
0.28 ± 0.75 
0.05 ± 0.23 
0.05 ± 0.23 
0.15 ± 0.37 
2.56 ± 2.23 
4.84 ± 3.52 
5.58 ± 4.61 
5.70 ± 3.73 
0.89 ± 2.08 
0.58 ± 1.17 
0.32 ± 0.75 
0.65 ± 0.87 
1 Ad.ministration 
0.17 ± 0.51 
0.84 ± 2.41 
0.47 ± 0.90 
0.15 ± 0.37 
0.17 ± 0.38 
0.00 ± 0.00 
0.05 ± 0.23 
0.05 ± 0.22 
3.00 ± 2.54 
3.10 ± 2.75 
5.89 ± 4.72 
3.35 ± 2.28 
0.33 ± 0.84 
0.26 ± 0.73 
0.10 ± 0.31 
0.34 ± 0.81 
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Table 2 
Variable 
DQo 
DQv 
M+ 
Mo 
(continued) 
PS 
PF 
NPS 
NPF 
PS 
PF 
NPS 
NPF 
PS 
PF 
NPS 
NPF 
PS 
PF 
NPS 
NPF 
Administration 
13.56 ± 7.17 
7.37 ± 4.57 
10.63 ± 5.54 
9.45 ± 5.33 
2.17 ± 2.91 
1.79 ± 1.69 
1.16±1.77 
1.40 ± 1.60 
0.05 ± 0.22 
0.00 ± 0.00 
0.00 ± 0.00 
0.00 ± 0.00 
1.40 ± 1.35 
0.84 ± 1.30 
2.74 ± 2.40 
1.15 ± 0. 99 
1 Administration 
8.44 ± 5.48 
10.84 ± 7.24 
7.05 ± 6 .26 
10.90 ± 4.04 
2.17 ± 2.68 
1.05 ± 1.31 
1.50 ± 1.22 
1.43 ± 1.71 
0.00 ± 0.00 
0.00 ± 0.00 
0.00 ± 0.00 
0.00 ± 0.00 
1.33 ± 1.78 
0.95 ± 0.78 
1.32 ± 1.60 
1.45 ± 0.89 
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Table 2 
Variable 
Mu 
M-
FQx+ 
FQxo 
(continued) 
PS 
PF 
NPS 
NPF 
PS 
PF 
NPS 
NPF 
PS 
PF 
NPS 
NPF 
PS 
PF 
NPS 
NPF 
Administration 
0.25 ± 0.55 
0.20 ± 0.41 
0.10 ± 0.31 
0.06 ± 0.24 
0.50 ± 0.83 
0.90 ± 1.52 
0.85 ± 2.45 
1. 00 ± 2. 65 
0.00 ± 0.00 
0.00 ± 0.00 
0.05 ± 0.22 
0.00 ± 0.00 
9.55 ± 3.99 
6.40 ± 3.15 
10.05 ± 4.03 
10.47 ± 4.18 
1 Administration 
0.28 ± 0.57 
0.10 ± 0.31 
0.21 ± 0.42 
0.18 ± 0.39 
0.67 ± 0.69 
0.84 ± 1.34 
0.84 ± 0.83 
0.88 ± 0.86 
0.00 ± 0.00 
0.00 ± 0.00 
0.00 ± 0.00 
0.00 ± 0.00 
6.89 ± 4.84 
7.05 ± 2.68 
7.05 ± 2.67 
6.59 ± 4.96 
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Table 2 
Variable 
FQxu 
FQx-
FQf+ 
FQf o 
(continued) 
PS 
PF 
NPS 
NPF 
PS 
PF 
NPS 
NPF 
PS 
PF 
NPS 
NPF 
PS 
PF 
NPS 
NPF 
Administration 
3.30 ± 2.67 
2.35 ± 1. 75 
2.35 ± 2.08 
2.29 ± 2.08 
5.25 ± 2.97 
4.95 ± 2.76 
5.30 ± 5.79 
5.35 ± 6.26 
0.00 ± 0.00 
0.00 ± 0.00 
0.00 ± 0.00 
0.00 ± 0.00 
4.06 ± 1.89 
2.16 ± 1.92 
2.68 ± 2.08 
1. 80 ± 1. 67 
1 Administration 
2.06 ± 1. 80 
3.10 ± 3.45 
2.05 ± 1. 90 
2.12 ± 1. 93 
5,00 ± 1.94 
5.05 ± 3.81 
5.26 ± 5.97 
5.59 ± 6.25 
0.00 ± 0.00 
0.00 ± 0.00 
0.00 ± 0.00 
0.00 ± 0.00 
2.78±1.77 
2. 68 ± 1. 53 
1. 95 ± 1. 54 
3.20±1.79 
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Table 2 
Variable 
FQfu 
FQf-
M 
FM 
(continued) 
PS 
PF 
NPS 
NPF 
PS 
PF 
NPS 
NPF 
PS 
PF 
NPS 
NPF 
PS 
PF 
NPS 
NPF 
Administration 
1. 22 ± 1. 00 
1. 00 ± 1. 25 
0.89 ± 1. 41 
0.95 ± 1. 32 
1.58 ± 1.71 
1.55 ± 1.60 
1. 61 ± 1. 48 
1.56 ± 1.54 
2.10 ± 1.80 
1.75 ± 2.12 
2. 85 ± 1. 66 
2.88 ± 1.49 
3.05 ± 2.78 
2.40 ± 1.50 
3.45 ± 2.23 
3.00 ± 1.84 
1 Administration 
0.67 ± 1. 08 
1.53 ± 1. 68 
0.68 ± 1. 06 
1. 25 ± 1.33 
1.56 ± 1.54 
2.00 ± 2.62 
1.42 ± 1. 71 
1.10 ± 1. 
2.11 ± 2.05 
2.05 ± 1.84 
2.89 ± 3.30 
2.65 ± 3.33 
2.11 ± 2.30 
2.58 ± 2.04 
2.10 ± 1.56 
1.94 ± 1.56 
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Table 2 
Variable 
ID 
c 
Cn 
CF 
(continued) 
PS 
PF 
NPS 
NPF 
PS 
PF 
NPS 
NPF 
PS 
PF 
NPS 
NPF 
PS 
PF 
NPS 
NPF 
Administration 
1.60 ± 2.35 
1.20 ± 1. 40 
1. 60 + 2.54 
1.71 ± 2.73 
0.30 ± 0.80 
0.30 ± 0.57 
0.35 ± 0.74 
0.41 ± 0.75 
0.00 ± 0.00 
0.00 ± 0.00 
0.00 ± 0.00 
0.00 ± 0.00 
1.40 ± 1.43 
1.65 ± 1.56 
1.60 ± 1.70 
1.59 ± 1.84 
1 Administration 
1. 44 ± 1. 25 
0.58 ± 0.84 
1.26 ± 1. 69 
1. 29 ± 1. 76 
0.50 ± 0.79 
0.42 ± 0.84 
0.37 ± 0.83 
0.41 ± 0.87 
0.00 ± 0.00 
0.00 ± 0.00 
0.00 ± 0.00 
0.00 ± 0.00 
1.11 ± 1.32 
1.10 ± 0.99 
1.32 ± 1.20 
1.23 ± 1.25 
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Table 2 
Variable 
FC 
C' 
C'F 
FC' 
(continued) 
PS 
PF 
NPS 
NPF 
PS 
PF 
N 
NPF 
PS 
PS 
NPS 
NPF 
PS 
PF 
NPS 
NPF 
Administration 
1. 65 ± 1. 75 
0.80 ± 1. 06 
1.35 ± 1. 23 
1. 41 ± 1.18 
0.05 ± 0.22 
0.05 ± 0.22 
0.00 ± 0.00 
0.00 ± 0.00 
0.10 ± 0.31 
0.35 ± 0.74 
0.20 ± 0.52 
0.23 ± 0.56 
1.10 ± 1.37 
1.00 ± 1.17 
0. 95 ± 1. 05 
1.00 ± 1.06 
1 Administration 
0.94 ± 1.00 
0.95 ± 1. 08 
1. 05 ± 1.35 
1. 06 ± 1. 39 
0.11 ± 0.32 
0.00 ± 0.00 
0.05 ± 0.23 
0.06 ± 0.24 
0.17 ± 0.38 
0.21 ± 0.53 
0.26 ± 0.93 
0.23 ± 0.97 
0. 90 ± 1. 08 
1.58 ± 1.57 
1.16 ± 1.71 
1.18 ± 1.78 
82 
2 
Table 2 
Variable 
y 
YF 
FY 
rF 
(continued) 
PS 
PF 
NPS 
NPF 
PS 
PF 
NPS 
NPF 
PS 
PF 
NPS 
NPF 
PS 
PF 
NPS 
NPF 
Administration 
0.05 ± 0.22 
0.05 ± 0.22 
0.20 ± 0.52 
0.23 ± 0.56 
0.25 ± 0.64 
0.05 ± 0.22 
0.10 ± 0.31 
0.12 ± 0.33 
1.45 ± 1.64 
0.60 ± 0.82 
0.75 ± 0.79 
0.65 ± 0.79 
0.15 ± 0.49 
0.05 ± 0.22 
0.10 ± 0.45 
0.12 ± 0.48 
1 Administration 
0.33 ± 0.77 
0.00 ± 0.00 
0.00 ± 0.00 
0.00 ± 0.00 
0.06 ± 0.24 
0.10 ± 0.31 
0.00 ± 0.00 
0.00 ± 0.00 
0.83 ± 0.92 
0.95 ± 1.13 
1.10 ± 1.49 
1.06 ± 1.56 
0.00 ± 0.00 
0.00 ± 0.00 
0.00 ± 0.00 
0.00 ± 0.00 
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Table 2 
Variable 
Fr 
FD 
F 
DV 
(continued) 
PS 
PF 
NPS 
NPF 
PS 
PF 
NPS 
NPF 
PS 
PF 
NPS 
NPF 
PS 
PF 
NPS 
NPF 
Administration 
0.20 ± 0.4i 
0.25 ± 0.64 
0.25 ± 0.55 
0.23 ± 0.56 
0.55 ± 0.89 
0.45 ± 0.69 
0.55 ± 0.76 
0.65 ± 0.79 
7.00 ± 2.79 
4.90 ± 3.54 
5.35 ± 3.72 
5.82 ± 3.71 
0.75 ± 1.12 
0.70±1.03 
0.50 ± 0.89 
0.59 ± 0.94 
1 Administration 
0.22 ± 0.55 
0.37 ± 0.83 
0.16 ± 0.50 
0.18 ± 0.53 
0.67 ± 0.69 
0.42 ± 0.61 
0.16 ± 0.37 
0.18 ± 0.09 
5.11 ± 2.93 
6.32 ± 3.96 
4.21 ± 3.10 
4.41 ± 3.18 
0.71 ± 1.26 
0.56 ± 0.86 
0.32 ± 0.95 
0.35 ± 1.00 
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Table 2 
Variable 
IN COM 
DR 
FABCOM 
ALOG 
(continued) 
PS 
PF 
NPS 
NPF 
PS 
PF 
NPS 
NPF 
PS 
PF 
NPS 
NPF 
PS 
PF 
NPS 
NPF 
Administration 
0.25 ± 0.44 
0.65 ± 1. 04 
0.25 ± 0.55 
0.18 ± 0.39 
0.30 ± 0.57 
0.80 ± 1.20 
0.10 ± 0.31 
0.12 ± 0.33 
0.30 ± 0.47 
0.60 ± 0.88 
0.25 ± 0.44 
0.23 ± 0.44 
0.20 ± 0.70 
0.05 ± 0.22 
0.00 ± 0.00 
0.00 ± 0.00 
1 Administration 
0.39 ± 0.78 
0.50 ± 0.71 
0.53 ± 0.84 
0.41 ± 0.62 
0.56 ± 1.25 
0.74 ± 1.24 
0. 68 ± 1. 53 
0.76 + 1.60 
0.33 ± 0.84 
0. 63 ± 1. 30 
0.68 ± 0.75 
0.65 ± 0.79 
0.00 ± 0.00 
0.05 ± 0.23 
0.05 ± 0.23 
0.06 ± 0.24 
85 
2 
Table 2 (continued) 
Variable 
CONT AM 
WSUM6 
PS 
PF 
NPS 
NPF 
PS 
PF 
NPS 
NPF 
D score PS 
PF 
NPS 
NPF 
Fr+rF PS 
PF 
NPS 
NPF 
Administration 
0.00 ± 0.00 
0.05 ± 0.22 
0.00 ± 0.00 
0.00 ± 0.00 
3.17 ± 2.85 
4.05 ± 2.17 
1.79±2.25 
4.25 ± 2.07 
-1.00 ± 1.50 
-0.63 ± 1.30 
-0.84 ± 1.34 
-1.25 ± 1.41 
0.39 ± 0.70 
0.32 ± 0.67 
0.37 ± 0.68 
0.10 ± 0.31 
1 Administration 
0.06 ± 0.24 
0.00 ± 0.00 
0.00 ± 0.00 
0.00 ± 0.00 
3.50 ± 3.38 
2.95 ± 3.10 
3.00 ± 2.98 
2.75 ± 1.97 
-0.41 ± 0.87 
-0.53 ± 0.70 
-0.32 ± 0.67 
-0.75 ± 1.07 
0.22 ± 0.55 
0.37 ± 0.83 
0.16 ± 0.50 
0.05 ± 0.22 
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Table 2 (continued) 
Variable 
Texture 
Vista 
Adj D 
PS 
PF 
NPS 
NPF 
PS 
PF 
NPS 
NPF 
PS 
PF 
NPS 
NPF 
3r+(2)/R PS 
PF 
NPS 
NPF 
Administration 
0.78 ± 0.88 
0.37 ± 0.60 
1.21 ± 1.27 
0.65 ± 0.81 
0.28 ± 0.46 
0.53 ± 0.77 
0.42 ± 0.69 
0.50 ± 0.83 
-0.72 ± 1.36 
0.00 ± 0.74 
-0.33 ± 0.97 
-0.25 ± 1.07 
0.27 ± 0.16 
0.33 ± 0.18 
0.44 ± 0.10 
0.32 ± 0.19 
1 Administration 
0.44 ± 0. 62 
0.37 ± 0.76 
0.32 ± 0.58 
0.75 ± 0.79 
0.17 ± 0.38 
0.26 ± 0.56 
0.53 ± 0.96 
0.25 ± 0.64 
-0.33 ± 0.69 
-0.58 ± 1.02 
-0.44 ± 0.86 
-0. 65 ± 1. 14 
0.23 ± 0.15 
0.37 ± 0.26 
0.40 ± 0.22 
0.34 ± 0.12 
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Table 2 (continued) 
Variable 
Lambda PS 
PF 
NPS 
NPF 
Isolate: R PS 
PF 
NPS 
NPF 
Ag 
CONFAB 
PS 
PF 
NPS 
NPF 
PS 
PF 
NPS 
NPF 
Administration 
0.74 ± 0.61 
0.56 ± 0.56 
0.52 ± 0.44 
0.40 ± 0.34 
0.16 ± 0.11 
0.09 ± 0.13 
0.13 ± 0.09 
0.16 ± 0.14 
1. 00 ± 1.17 
1.50 ± 1.69 
0. 68 ± 1. 20 
1.55 ± 1.54 
0.06 ± 0.24 
0.00 ± 0.00 
0.05 ± 0.23 
0.00 ± 0.00 
1 Administration 
0.72 ± 0.70 
0.88 ± 0.71 
0.44 ± 0.31 
0.65 ± 0.56 
0.15 ± 0.14 
0.14 ± 0.16 
0.08 + 0.09 
0.14 ± 0.12 
1.47 ± 1.37 
0.33 ± 0.59 
1.63 ± 1.89 
0.30 ± 0.57 
0.00 ± 0.00 
0.06 ± 0.24 
0.05 ± 0.23 
0.00 ± 0.00 
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Table 2 
Variable 
CP 
MOR 
PER 
PSV 
(continued) 
Administration 
PS 
PF 
NPS 
NPF 
PS 
PF 
NPS 
NPF 
PS 
PF 
NPS 
NPF 
PS 
PF 
NPS 
NPF 
0.06 ± 0.24 
0.00 ± 0.00 
0.00 ± 0.00 
0.00 ± 0.00 
1.35 ± 1.58 
2.17 ± 1.92 
1.21 ± 1.40 
2.20 ± 1.28 
0.94 ± 1.75 
1.11 ± 1.45 
1.42 ± 1.64 
1.50±2.70 
0.53 ± 0.87 
0.06 ± 0.24 
0. 68 ± 1. 86 
0.30 ± 0.57 
1 Administration 
0.59 ± 0.24 
o.oo ± 0.00 
0.00 ± 0.00 
0.00 ± 0.00 
2.23 ± 2.11 
0.78 ± 0.94 
2.05 ± 2.39 
0.45 ± 0.94 
0.29 ± 0.85 
0.56 ± 0.98 
1.05 ± 2.48 
0.85 ± 1.27 
0.23 ± 0.75 
0.17 ± 0.51 
0.47 ± 1.84 
0.10 ± 0.31 
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Table 2 
Variable 
Depi 
SConst 
Sczi 
X+% 
X-% 
(continued) 
PS 
PF 
NPS 
NPF 
PS 
PF 
NPS 
NPF 
PS 
PF 
NPS 
NPF 
PS 
PF 
NPS 
NPF 
PS 
PF 
NPS 
NPF 
Administration 
1.28 ± 0.89 
1. 57 ± 1.12 
0.84 ± 0.69 
1.30 ± 0.91 
4.78 ± 1. 52 
6.26 ± 1. 56 
4.58 ± 1. 61 
5.45 ± 1. 43 
2.56 ± 0.86 
2.68 ± 0.67 
2.21 ± 0. 92 
2.75 ± 1. 07 
0.50 ± 0.17 
0.43 ± 0.15 
0.58 ± 0.15 
0.46 ± 0.19 
0.41 ± 0.17 
0.52 ± 0.15 
0.39 ± 0.17 
0.53 ± 0.19 
1 Administration 
1. 39 ± 0.92 
0.84 ± 0.60 
1. 05 ± 0.83 
0.55 ± 0.60 
5.94 ± 1. 89 
4.79 ± 1. 81 
5.68 ± 1. 94 
4.60 ± 1. 27 
2.83 ± 0.86 
2.58 ± 0.77 
2.53 ± 0.77 
2.50 ± 0.89 
0.43 ± 0.20 
0.49 ± 0.17 
0.46 ± 0.19 
0.56 ± 0.18 
0.51 ± 0.18 
0.50 ± 0.17 
0.46 ± 0.20 
0.40 ± 0.16 
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Table 2 (continued) 
Variable Administration 1 Administration 
F+% PS 0.58 ± 0.21 0.53 ± 0.28 
PF 0.54 ± 0.67 0.47 ± 0.29 
NPS 0.53 ± 0.33 0.48 ± 0.34 
NPF 0.38 ± 0.32 0.66 ± 0.27 
PS=psychiatric, standard instructions first 
PF=psychiatric, fake instructions first 
NPS=nonpsychiatric, standard instructions first 
NPF=nonpsychiatric, fake instructions first 
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Table 3 
Scores Collapsed Across Psychiatric Status 
and Instructional Set (Means and Standard Deviations) 
Mean Standard Deviation 
Variable Administration 1 Administration 2 
w 8.39 ± 3.42 7.04 ± 2.89 
Zf 10.62 ± 4.10 8.86 ± 3.23* 
Fire 0.43 ± 0.66 0.18 ± 0.51* 
Food 0.92 ± 0.33 0.26 ± 0.60* 
*significance difference across administrations, ~ < .05. 
Table 4 
Human Movement (M+ and Mo) Responses by 
Psychiatric Status and Initial Instruction (Means and 
Standard Deviations) 
Administration 1 
Psychiatric s 1. 28 + 1. 41 
F 0.84 ± 1.30" 
NonPsychiatric s 2.74 + 2.40" 
s 
F 
I\ 
F 1.15 ± 0. 99" 
standard instructions first 
Fake instructions first 
significant difference, ~ < .05. 
Administration 
1.33 ± 1. 78 
0.95 ± 0.78 
1.32 ± 1.60* 
1. 45 ± 0.89 
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* significant differences across administrations, ~ < 
.05. 
Table 5 
Scores Across Administrations by Instructional Set 
(Means and Standard Deviations) 
Vgria;Qlfl Ini:!;;,;igl Adm in 1 Adm in 2 
Instruction 
DQ+ Standard 4.07 ± 3.42 4.45 ± 3.65 
Fake 5.27 ± 3.62 3.23 ± 2.52* 
DQo Standard 12.09 ± 6,35A 7.75 ± 4,95*A 
Fake 8.41 ± 5,57A 10.87 ± 5,64*A 
FQx+/o Standard 9.87 ± 4,17A 7.81 ± 3.67* 
Fake 6.98 ± 3,13A 6.97 ± 3.75 
FQxu/- Standard 7.71 ± 5,78A 7.19 ± 4.91 
Fake 8.49 ± 3.49A 7.58 ± 4.72* 
FQf+/o Standard 3.37 ± l,99A 2.36 ± 1.66* 
Fake 1. 98 ± 1. 80A 2.98 ± 1.60* 
X+% Standard 0.54 ± 0,16A 0.44 ± 0.20* 
Fake 0.44 ± 0,17A 0.53 ± 0.18 
X-% Standard 0.40 ± 0,17A 0.49 ± 0.17* 
Fake 0.53 ± 0,19A 0.45 ± 0.16* 
WSUM6 Standard 2.46 ± 2,54A 3.24 ± 3.17 
Fake 4.15 ± 2,12A 2.84 ± 2.52* 
Adj D Standard -0.53 ± l,13A -0.39 ± 0.77 
Fake -0.01 ± 0.91A -0.61 ± 1.07* 
Lambda Standard 0.63 ± 0.52 0.58 ± 0.50 
Fake 0.48 ± 0.45 0.71 ± 0.53* 
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Table 5 (continued) 
:sz:a;i::iable Initial Adm in 1 Adm in 2 
Instruction 
Suicide-C 
Standard 4.69 ± 1. 56A 5.81 ± l, 92 *A 
Fake 5.85 ± 1. 49A 4.69 ± l,54*A 
De pi Index 
Standard 1. 06 ± 0,79A 1. 22 + 0,97A 
Fake 1. 46 ± 0,97A 0.70 ± 0,60*A 
Scz Index 
Standard 2.38 ± 0.89 2.68 + 0.81 
Fake 2.72 ± 0.39 2.54 ± 0.83 
A significant group difference per administration, 
I2 < .05. 
* significant change across administrations, I2 < .05. 
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Table 6 
Demographic Characteristics of Clinical Judges 
~ Teach Rorschach Supervise Rorschach 
Male=46% Yes = 21% Yes = 58% 
Female=54% No = 79% No = 42% 
~ Degree Research with Rorschach 
<30yrs.=8.33% Doctorate=79% Yes = 16.67% 
31-35yrs =4.17 Masters=21% No= 83.33% 
36-40yrs.=33.33% 
40-50yrs.=29.17% 
>50 yrs.=25% 
Rorschach Experience 
<2yrs.= 8.33% 
2-5yrs.= 12.5% 
5-lOyrs.= 33.33% 
>lOyrs.= 45.84% 
Exner Scoring Experience 
<1 yr.= 4.17% 
1-3yrs=16.67% 
4-6yrs=29.17% 
>6yrs.=50% 
Table 7 
Clinical Judges' Ratings of Protocols (Means and 
Standard Deviations) 
Variable Psychiatric Status Standard Prot Fake 
Fake Psychiatric 4.31 ± 1.69" 4.90 
Nonpsychiatric 5.55 ± 0. 92" 3.31 
SConst Psychiatric 3.47 ± 1. 72 3.67 
Nonpsychiatric 4.10 ± 1. 60 2. 67 
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Prot. 
± 1. 05 
± 1. 7 6*# 
± 1. 40 
± 1. 37* 
*significant difference between protocols, ~ < .05. 
#higher scores indicate greater likelihood that protocol 
was standard. 
"significant difference between groups, ~ < .05. 
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Table 8 
Clinical Judges' Importance Ratings of Rorschach Factors 
on Decision Making (Means and Standard Deviations) 
Variable 
Content 
SConst 
Ratios 
Standard 
1.90 ± 0.97 
3.78 ± 1.66 
2.33 ± 1.22 
Protocol 
.E..ak.e_ 
2.08 ± 0.84*# 
3.17 ± 1.38* 
2.97 ± 1.39* 
*significant difference between protocols, ~ < .05. 
#Lower scores indicate weightings of higher importance 
in decision making 
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Table 9 
Clinical Judges' Ratings of Rorschach Factors 
on Decision Making <Means and Standard Deviations) 
Variable 
FQx 
Ratios 
Protocol 
Psychiatric 
3. 05 + 1. 40 
2.33 ± 1.03 
Nonpsychiatric 
2.67 + 1.24*# 
2.97 ± 1.58* 
*significant difference between protocols, ~ < .05. 
#Lower scores indicate weightings of higer importance in 
decision making. 
100 
Table 10 
Mean Responses for Protocols 
Variable E.S ll NE.£ NE..S.*+ 
R 18 15.5 27 14 
Blends 6.5 2.5 10 1 
H 3 2.5 1 3 
Bl 1. 5 1 2 0 
Sx 0.5 2.5 4 0 
c 0 0 3 0 
FC' 1 0.5 4 0.5 
In com 1 0.5 3 0 
Fabcom 1. 5 1. 5 2 0 
Ag 3.0 0.5 2 0 
WSUM6 14 14.5 7 0 
X+% 0.40 0.61 0.44 0.75 
X-% 0.60 0. 39 0.52 0.25 
SConst 6 6 7 2 
+ PS=psychiatric, standard; PF=psychiatric, fake; 
NPF=nonpsychiatric, fake; NPS=nonpsychiatric, standard 
* n=2 for each group 
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Appendix A 
Rorschach Variables 
Determinants (to be corrected for total 
Productivity) 
Content 
p 
M 
FM 
M 
CF+C+Cn 
FC 
FC'+C'=C'F 
T+TF+FT 
Y+YF+FY 
FD 
F 
Fr+rF 
( 2) 
(Already Corrected for R) 
R 
Zd 
D 
Adj D 
H+ (H) : Hd+ (Hd) 
Afr 
3r+(2)/R 
L 
Blends: 
x + % 
x - % 
F + g_ 0 
W:M 
W:D 
Isolate: 
R 
R 
sx 
Al 
AY 
Bl 
Cg 
EX 
Fl 
Hh 
SC 
(Other content categories 
are incorporated in ratios 
below) 
Ab+Art 
An+Xy 
Pure H 
H+A:Hd+Ad 
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Appendix B 
Mental Health Screening Instrument 
During the past four weeks, how much of the time did you 
feel: 
A)_unhappy b) anxious c)_depressed d) irritable? 
·'. 
None of the time 
A little bit of tt1e ti me 
Some of the time 
Most of the ti me 
All of the time 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
L--------------...J...----·-=;;;__-----··-··-
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Appendix C 
Judges' Evaluation Form I 
Part 1 
Respondents were asked to take the Rorschach under 
standard conditions and to take it with the intention of 
creating a misimpression of themselves to clinicians. 
Please indicate if you think the attached protocol was 
given under standard or "faked" instructional sets. Circle 
the answer on the rating scale that best represents your 
answer. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Very sure Sure Somewhat Neu- Somewhat Sure Very 
Faked Faked Sure tr al Sure Stand- sure 
Instruct- Faked Standard ard Stand-
ions Instr-
uctions 
Part 2 
Please indicate how important the following factors were in 
making your foregoing decision by using the following 
continuum (Please rate all choices) 
1 3 4 5 
Not very 
important 
2 
Impor-
tant 
Somewhat Neut- Somewhat 
important ral unimpor-
tant 
____ 1. Content of Rorschach responses 
2. Location Features 
----3. Determinants 
----4. Form Quality 
----5. S-Constellation 
----
6. Special Scoring 
6 7 
Unimpor- Very 
tant unim-
portant 
----
7. Ratio, Percentages, and Derivations 
----
8. Sequence of Responses 
____ 9. Other (Please explain) 
Appendix C 
Judges' Evaluation Form II 
Protocol No. 
Part 1 
We would like for you to rate each protocol along a 
continuum of maladjustment. Please circle the number 
that you think is most representative of the protocol 
identified above. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Severely Very Some- Neutral Some- Adjusted Well 
Malad- Malad- what what ad-
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justed justed ma lad- adjust- justed 
justed ed 
Part 2 
Please indicate how important the following factors were 
in making your foregoing decision by using the following 
continuum. (Please rate all choices) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
very impor- some- neutral some- unimpor- not 
imp or- tant what what tant imp or-
tant imp or- unimpor- tant 
tant tant at all 
1. Content of Rorschach responses 
2. Location features 
3. Determinants 
4. Form Quality 
5. S - Constellation 
6. Special scoring 
7. Ratios, percentages and derivations 
8. Sequence of responses 
9. Other (please explain): 
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Appendix C 
Judges' Evaluation Form II (cont.) 
Part 3 
Please feel free to make any comments you would like 
pertaining to the individual protocols or the study in 
general: 
Enter your name and address below ~ if you would like 
to receive feedback concerning your accuracy rate. 
Name: 
Address: 
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Appendix D 
Judges' Demography Questionnaire 
Please complete all items by checking the appropriate 
spaces, and return this form with your protocol 
evaluations. 
1.Your sex 2.Your age? 
male less than 30 
female between 31-35 
between 36-40 
between 40-50 
Older than 50 
3.Your highest 
degree? 
Ph.D. 
__ Psy.D. 
Ed.D. 
6 Yr. 
Certificate 
M.A.or M.S. 
---
Other 
----
(specify) 
4. Approximately how long have you used the Rorschach? 
Less than 2 yrs 2 to 5 yrs 5 to 10 yrs 
more than 10 yrs 
5. Approximately how long have you used the 
Comprehensive System? 
less than 1 yr 
more than 6 yrs 
1 to 3 yrs 4 to 6 yrs 
6. Have you ever published or presented a paper 
concerning the Rorschach? 
Yes No 
7. Do you teach Rorschach assessment? 
Yes No 
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Appendix D 
Judges' Demography Questionnaire (cont'd) 
8. Do you supervise Rorschach assessment? 
Yes No 
9. Which of the following describes your primary work 
setting? 
Corrections Federal Governmnet 
General Medical Hospital 
Medical School ~~Outpatient Clinic 
Private Practice ~~Psychiatric Hospital 
School system~~University Other (specify) 
10. Please check any two that reflect the groups most 
common in your work in assessment. 
Adolescents Adults 
Families Forensic 
Other 
Children ~~Day Care 
Inpatients ~~Outpatients 
RESULTS OF THE STUDY WILL BE SENT TO ALL WORKSHOP ALUMNI. 
IF YOU WOULD LIKE TO KNOW ABOUT YOUR OWN ACCURACY RATE, 
PLEASE ENTER YOUR NAME AND ADDRESS HERE: 
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